The regulation and supervision of banks around the world - a new database by Barth, James R. et al.
w___  __  __  AS
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  25 8 8
The Regulation and  This new  and  comprehensive
database on the  regulation
Supervision of Banks  and supervision  of  banks in
around the W  orld  1  07 countries  should  better around  the  W  orld  ~~~~~~~~~~~inform  advice  about  bank
regulation  and  supervision
A New Database  and lower the marginal cost

























































































































dPOLICY  RESEARCH WORKING  PAPER 2588
Summary findings
International consultants on bank regulation and  currently regulated and supervised, and about bank
supervision for developing countries often base their  structures and deposit insurance schemes, for a broad
advice on how their home country does things, for lack  cross-section of countries.
of information  on practice in other countries.  In addition to describing the data, Barth, Caprio, and
Recommendations for reform have tended to be shaped  Levine show how variables may be grouped and
by bias rather than facts.  aggregated. They also show some simple correlations
To better inform advice about bank regulation and  among selected variables.
supervision and to lower the marginal cost of empirical  In a companion paper ("Bank Regulation and
research, Barth, Caprio, and Levine present and discuss a  Supervision: What Works Best") studying the
new and comprehensive database on the regulation and  relationship between differences in bank regulation and
supervision of banks in 107 countries. The data, based  supervision and bank performance and stability, they
on surveys sent to national bank regulatory and  conclude that:
supervisory authorities, are now available to researchers  *  Countries with policies that promote  private
and policymakers around the world.  monitoring of banks have better bank performance and
The data cover such aspects of banking as entry  more stability. Countries with more generous deposit
requirements, ownership restrictions, capital  insurance schemes tend to have poorer bank
requirements, activity restrictions, external auditing  performance and more bank fragility.
requirements, characteristics of deposit insurance  *  Diversification of income streams and loan
schemes, loan classification and provisioning  portfolios-by  not restricting bank activities-also  tends
requirements, accounting and disclosure requirements,  to improve performance and stability. (This works best
troubled  bank resolution actions, and  (uniquely) the  when an active securities market exists.) Countries in
quality of supervisory personnel and their actions.  which banks are encouraged to diversify their portfolios
The database permits users to learn how banks are  domestically and internationally suffer fewer crises.
This  paper-a  product  of  Finance,  Development  Research  Group,  and  the  Financial  Sector  Strategy  and  Policy
Department-is  part of a larger effort in the Bank to compile data on financial regulation and supervision and the advise
countries on what works best. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project
"Bank Regulation and Supervision:  What Works and What Does Not."  The companion paper and data may be downloaded
at www.worldbank.org/research/projectslbank_regulation.htm). Copies of this paper  are available free from the World
Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Agnes  Yaptenco, room MC3-446,  telephone 202-473-
8526, fax 202-522-1155,  email address ayaptenco@'worldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on
the  Web  at  http://econ.worldbank.org.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  jbarth@business.auburn.edu,
gcaprio@worldbank.org,  or rlevine@csom.umn.edu. April 2001.  (87 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to  encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less  than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
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Notwithstanding  all the accomplishments  in the fields  of finance and financial  economics in the
last two decades, if a survey were taken of all the international  consultants  on appropriate  bank
regulation  and supervision  for developing  countries,  what would be the best way to predict the
advice they would offer? Anecdotal  evidence  accumulated  over the years suggests  that an
astonishingly  high degree of accuracy  could be obtained merely by knowing each consultant's
country of origin: experts almost always view their own regulatory and supervisory  framework
as an appropriate  model for developing  countries. Beyond some inevitable 'home bias,' what
would explain such a good fit? The answer is that until now there was no systematically
assembled  database on the way in which countries  regulate and supervise  their banking  systems,
and thus no comprehensive  analysis of which regulatory  and supervisory  practices  are most
appropriate. This ignorance of the facts provides fertile  ground for reform recommendations
based instead on bias.
To contribute  to a better understanding  of bank regulatory and supervisory  regimes, this
paper presents and discusses  a new and comprehensive  database  based upon a survey  sent to
national bank regulatory and supervisory  authorities. These data are available to researchers  on
the World Wide Web.' For the first time, the data enable one to identify  the existing regulation
and supervision  of banks (and selective  features of bank structure  and deposit insurance
schemes)  in 107 countries  at all levels of income and in all parts of the world. 2 With this
database one can now determine  more fully  the "stylized  facts" for banking on a global basis.
This database  can be found at the World  Bank's website  for financial  sector  research,
http://www.worldbank.org/research/interest/intrstweb.htm,  under the heading 'Data.'
2  Admittedly,  some individuals  have assembled  significant  "bits and pieces" of this type of database for selected
countries. But there has been no truly broad and detailed  database from official sources  that would enable one to
assess as many different and important  aspects  of the banking systems  for as many countries  as presented and
discussed  here.
2Most importantly,  we compiled  these data to lower the marginal  cost of doing empirical
research on bank regulation  and supervision. We expect these data and the ensuing research to
provide a much firmer foundation  for policy reforms.  In a companion paper [Barth,  Caprio, arid
Levine, 2001], we use these data to identify those regulatory  and supervisory  practices  most
closely associated  with better bank perfoirmance  and more stability. This effort is clearly a
beginning,  not an end.
The remainder  of the paper proceeds  as follows.  The next section describes  the data and
how they were obtained. It also draws  upon our new and comprehensive  database to provide a
selective overview  of some of the important  ways in which banking systems differ across
countries. The third section  discusses  and examines  ways to group and aggregate variables from
this dataset to provide  a potentially  more meaningful  characterization  of a country's  banking
system. It also discusses  ways in which these variables  may be, if not already, quantified  to
better assess the degree to which countries  differ. 3 The fourth section provides a description  oi-
the differences in the variables when countries  are aggregated  by income level or region,  and
also presents some correlations  among key variables. The final section concludes  with some
early and illustrative findings (Barth,  Caprio, and Levine, 2001) using this database.
II.  Survey and Data
In 1998  we designed  and then implemented  a survey funded by the World Bank to collect
detailed and comprehensive  information  on the regulation  and supervision  of commercial  banks
in as many countries  as possible. 4 We also requested information  on selected  aspects of bank
3Such  quantification  is also important  in assessing  the relationship  between different features  of a banking system
and various financial and economic  outcomes  as discussed in the final section.
4 We started  the process with  Joaquin Gutierrez's (formerly  of the World Bank and now with the Central Bank of
Spain) detailed  questionnaire  and then supplemented  it based  upon significant  advice from bank supervisors  at the
World Bank.  Both David Scott and Vincent  Polizatto  have extensive  experience in emerging markets  and thus were
3structure and deposit insurance  schemes. The formulation  and completion  of the survey entailed
a number of inter-related  steps. The Basel Committee  on Banking Supervision  provided us with
information  so that we could contact  appropriate  individuals  at national  regulatory and
supervisory  agencies. Furthermore,  since the World  Bank routinely conducts  seminars for bank
supervisors  from emerging  market countries,  we asked participants  at these sessions  to complete
the survey. In some cases, World  Bank personnel  traveling  to countries  that had not yet
responded to the survey delivered  the survey  to the appropriate  officials.
5 Despite these efforts, there were problems. All countries did not respond  to the survey.
Also, officials from the same country  or even the same agency sometimes  provided  conflicting
answers  to the same questions. Thus, we had to follow-up  with authorities  to resolve these
issues. In addition, the Office of the Comptroller  of the Currency  (OCC)  conducted a much
narrower survey that nonetheless  overlaps  with a subset  of the information  we collected.
Consequently,  we checked responses  from the two surveys  and attempted  to reconcile any
inconsistencies. 6 The Financial  Stability  Forum's Working  Group on Deposit Insurance  also
provided input on the accuracy  of responses  regarding  certain individual  country's  deposit
insurance  schemes.  Most of the information  from the responses  is for 1999.7
The survey is comprised  of twelve separate parts, with about 175 questions,  covering the
following  aspects  of a country's  banking system:
*  Entry into banking
particularly  important  in this regard. We next condensed  the survey  to a manageable  form after adding questions
related to economic  incentives  and vetting it with other  banking experts  as well as those skilled  in conducting
surveys. We also simplified  the survey  after receiving  feedback from a few countries  early in the process to reduce
ambiguities  and facilitate  accurate responses. The authors,  of course,  retain  sole responsibility  for the final form of
the survey.
Responses were received  from 107 countries.  However, many of these countries  did not respond  to each and every
question. More information  about the response  rate to different  questions  is presented  below.
This overlap and checking  only affected selected activity  and ownership  variables as  indicated  below. We also




*  External auditing requirements
* Internal  management/organizational  requirements
*  Liquidity and diversification  requirements
*  Depositor (savings) protection  schemes
*  Provisioning  requirements
* Accounting/information  disclosure  requirements
*  Discipline/problem  institutions/exit,  and
* Supervision
Since our database is readily available on the web, 8 the remainder  of this section  provides
a sample  of the information  we have collected and assembled  into more useable form. Tables 1
and 2 provide  an overview  of some basic differences  in banking  systems  for 107 countries at all
levels of income and in all parts of the world. This informnation  covers the administrative
structure  of bank supervision,  selective  aspects  of the banking  industry, and the regulatory and
supervisory  environment  in which banks operate.
Table I shows what body or agency supervises  banks, whether there is more than one
supervisory  body, and to whom supervisory  bodies are responsible  or accountable.  Of 107
countries, 89 have a single supervisory  body and 18 countries  have two or more. Of those
countries  with only one supervisory  body, moreover,  in about two-thirds of the cases it is the
central bank. Furthermore,  with respect to whom  the supervisory  bodies are responsible  or
accountable,  it is usually  the finance ministry.  This type of administrative-structure  information
7 Of the 107 responses  received, 13 were received in November 1998,  65 were received in 1999,  and 29 in 2000,
with 19 of the latter received  in either January  or February.
s See footnote 1 for the location. Those without  access  to the web can contact Agnes Yaptenco  (The World  Bank,
1818  H St., N.W., Washington,  D.C. 20433,  202-473-1823,  fax:  202-522-1155;  Ayaptenco@worldbank.org).
5is helpful in assessing  whether  the number,  location  and independence  of supervisory  bodies
matters, in addition  to its benchmarking  value.
Table 2 shows the differences  in the size and structure  of the banking  industry. It also
shows the extent to which overall bank activities are restricted. Furthermore,  information  is
provided on the number of professional  supervisors  per bank and whether supervisors  are legally
liable for their actions. The table shows, moreover,  whether  there is an explicit deposit insurance
scheme. Lastly, information  on the degree  to which the biggest  banks are rated by international
rating agencies is provided. This type of data is very important  in understanding  what the term
"bank" signifies  in different countries as well as in assessing  what matters for the performance
and stability  of a country's  banking industry,  and ultimately  for overall financial and economic
activity.
There are two measures of the size of a country's  banking  industry in Table 2. One
measure is total bank assets as a percentage  of GDP. 9 A second measure is the number  of banks
per 100,000  people. Both of these measures  show substantial  variation across countries,  even
when excluding countries with offshore  banking  centers. Two countries  that many point to when
emphasizing  differences in banking industries  and in ways of regulating  banksl' are Germany
and the U.S. As may be seen, total bank assets as a percentage  of GDP are 313 percent in
Germany,  but a much lower 66 percent in the U.S. It is in large  part due to these figures  that
Germany is described as having  a bank-based  financial  system,  while the U.S is described  as
having  a capital market-based  financial system.  At the same time, however,  the number of banks
per 100,000  people is about the same in the two countries.  Yet, the latter  figures for both
9  The information  on total bank assets is obtained from the OCC survey.
10  German  banks are frequently  referred  to as "universal"  banks because of the wide range of activities in which they
are allowed  to engage. In this regard, compare  the position of  Germany  relative  to the U.S. (and  other countries  ) in
Figure 6. The differences  between Germany  and the U.S. with respect to regulations  regarding the activities in
which banks may engage have narrowed  significantly  as a result of a change in banking law in the U.S. in late 1999.
6Germany and the U.S. are considerably  higher  than the corresponding  figures for most other
countries.
Table 2 indicates  that there is substantial  variation  in the bank structure  variables across
countries.  There are three types of structural  variables:  (1) the percentage  of deposits accounted
for by the 5 largest  banks; (2) the percentage  of total assets that are government  owned; and (3)
the percentage  of total bank assets that are foreign owned.  The concentration  measure for the
U.S. is relatively low at 21 percent as compared  to every other economy  except Germany,
Guyana, and Taiwan (China).  The degree  of concentration  is quite high even in some countries
that have many banks, such as Russia with more than 1,300  banks but also a 5 bank
concentration  figure of 80 percent.
As regards government  ownership,  there are a large number of countries for which the
share of total bank assets accounted  for by government-owned  banks is not only positive but also
fairly high. In nine countries  the figure exceeds  60 percent.  In India  the figure is 80 percent.
Germany  has a figure that is much lower than this but still relatively  high at 42 percent. At the
other end of the spectrum  are countries like the U.K. and the U.S. for which the government-
ownership  figures are zero percent.
The share of total commercial  bank assets accounted  for by foreign-owned  banks also
displays wide variation,  ranging from a low of zero percent in India to a high of 99 percent in
New Zealand.  The latter country  has essentially  "outsourced"  its entire banking industry.
Germany,  the U.S., and Japan all report relatively low figures of 4, 5 and 6 percent, respectively.
Some countries  have laws limiting  entry by foreign banks, as will be discussed later, which helps
account for some of these differences across countries.  It might be noted that among the
European Union (EU) countries  listed in the table, consolidation  across national borders is still
relatively  modest.
7A particularly important  variable  in Table 2 is labeled  Overall Bank Activities and
Ownership  Restrictiveness. More will be said about  the exact way in which this variable is
constructed in the next section. For now it is enough to say that it measures  the overall degree to
which banks are permitted  to engage in securities,  insurance  and real estate activities as well as
to own nonfinancial  firms. It ranges in value from 1  to 4. The lowest value indicates  that no
restrictions are placed on this type of diversification  by banks, whereas  the highest value
indicates  that such diversification  is prohibited.  This particular  variable largely defines  what is
meant by the word "bank".  Given the substantial  variation in this variable among  countries, it is
clear that a bank is not the same thing in different  countries.  Countries  like Germany  (1.3) and
New Zealand (1.0) allow  their banks unrestricted  access  to this type of diversification.  Other
countries like China (3.5) and Indonesia  (3.5) are severely  restrictive.  Even Japan and the U.S
were quite restrictive  until very recently  when changes  in banking laws and regulations  were
made. More generally,  this variable clearly indicates  that the regulatory environment,  not just
unfettered  market forces, importantly  determines  what banks in different countries  around the
world may do.
Table 2 also shows  that the supervisory  environment  variables vary substantially  among
countries.  Although only two variables are presented in the table -Supervisors  per Bank and Are
Supervisors  Legally  Liable for Their Actions-  they are indicative  of the types of differences  that
exist. Some economies  have relatively  high ratios of professional  supervisors  per bank, such as
Taiwan (China)  with 18 and Honduras  with 12. Others like the U.S. and Turkey  have relatively
low ratios, which are 0.1 and 0.4, respectively.  As regards holding  supervisors  legally liable for
their actions, countries  are fairly evenly split,  with 42 countries (including  Argentina  and Brazil)
doing so and 56 countries not doing so (such as the U.K. and U.S.).
8It is clear from Table 2 that there are a relatively large  number of countries  that do not yet have
an explicit deposit insurance  scheme. Indeed,  of the 107  countries, 50 do not have a scheme."I
Presumably,  depositors in countries  without  one must monitor  closely the banks in which their
funds reside. To assist in monitoring,  international  credit rating agencies rate the bigger banks in
some countries.  The extent to which this is done is indicated  in the table by the variable  named
Percentage  of the 10 Biggest  Banks Rated by International  Agencies.  The percentage  differs
significantly  among the countries,  with many reporting  that no banks are rated and also many
reporting  that all banks are rated. In Cambodia  no banks are rated, whereas in Botswana all
banks are rated. And in Chile 50 percent of the ten biggest banks are rated. These examples
nicely illustrate  the type of diversity  that exists.
Some pictures  help depict the high degree of cross-country  variation in the data. Figure 1
shows the dramatic divergences  in what banks can do, and whether  they can own or be owned by
nonfinancial  firms. Clearly, individual  countries  can 'mix and match' from these individual
categories,  but even at an aggregate  level, the degree of dispersion is notable. The most
restricted  bank activity among countries  is real estate and the least restricted  is securities. Indeed,
in the 107  countries, 37 percent prohibit  real estate activities,  whereas only 7 percent prohibit
securities activities.' 2 The way in which the mixing of banking  and commerce is treated also
indicates  significant  differences  across countries.  Interestingly  enough, a much higher percentage
of countries  (36 percent) permit unrestricted  ownership  of banks by nonfinancial  firms than bank
"  In the World  Bank database on deposit insurance,  which is believed  to be the most comprehensive,  about 70
countries  have explicit deposit insurance  as of 2000,  out of approximately  200 countries.
12  It is clear that most countries  consider securities  activities  to be much more acceptable  banking activities than
either insurance  or real estate activities.  Until the enactment  of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley  Act on November 12,
1999, this was also the case in the U.S. Now securities  and insurance  activities  are treated equally as unrestricted
activities,  with only real estate activities remaining  severely restricted.
9ownership  of nonfinancial  firms (13 percent). More generally,  it is clear that the mixing of
banking and commerce is prohibited in a relatively small percentage  of the 107 countries.
Banks differ dramatically  also in their size relative  to the economy  (Figure 2). In some
countries, such as the U.S., the relatively small size of banking  reflects the development  of other
forms of intermediation,  but in many more it simply  depicts  the underdevelopment  of the
financial sector. Bank concentration  also differs dramatically  (Figure 3): in small economies,  the
5 largest banks account for all or almost all deposits,  while in larger economies  they control far
less of the market for deposits.
Ownership  of banks by governments  (Figure 4)13  and by foreign  entities (Figure 5) could
hardly vary more. Figure 6 shows the variation  in overall restrictiveness,  mentioned  above.
Capturing the way bank supervisors operate is challenging - more on this below -- but Figure 7
gives one a sense that there are real differences  here: from Taiwan (China),  where there are 18
supervisors  per bank, to the U.S., Cayman  Islands,  and the Maldives,  where there are 10 or more
banks per supervisor. Market  or private monitoring  also is complex  - again, more below - but
Figure 8 shows the presence of international  rating agencies  - those which might be more likely
to operate at arms length from their clients  - covers a wide range.
All the figures  just discussed  reveal substantial  variation  across countries.  Lest one
conclude  that this is the case for each and every  variable in our database, we direct the reader to
Figure 9. This figure shows  the minimum  risk-based  capital requirement  for banks among
countries.  Clearly, there is not the variation  shown in the other figures.  Of 106 countries, 60
13  Researchers  who have employed  data on foreign  ownership  from Bankscope  undoubtedly know that this series
differs significantly  from that source in numerous  cases. The variable reported here defines foreign ownership  as
50% or more control, and our responses  are the views of supervisory  agencies,  whereas  Bankscope  data are based on
survey responses  from individual  banks. This creates biases depending  upon which types (i.e., government  owned,
domestic,  private  owned, or foreign owned)  and number  of banks respond.
10percent set the minimum  requirement  at 8 percent and another 14 percent set it at 10 percent. 14
Not surprisingly,  given this lack of variation,  when countries  were asked in the survey whether
the minimum  capital requirement  was in line with Basle guidelines,  of 107  countries, 93 percent
answered yes. Such near unanimity  across so many  countries  with differences in bank risk
exposure obviously reinforces  questions  about the accuracy  and usefulness  of these guidelines at
an aggregated  level. Figure 10, moreover,  shows that, of 92 countries,  in 96 percent of them the
actual capital-to-asset  ratio equals or exceeds  the required  minimum. 15 The fact that these
particular  ratios are not necessarily  comparable  from one country  to the next, however, only
reinforces  the previous concern about accuracy  and usefulness.  The reason for the lack of
comparability  is that based upon our database selected  items are deducted from capital in  some
countries, while in others they are not before the ratio is calculated.  Of 104 countries,  for
example,  57 deduct the market value of loan losses not yet realized,  whereas the remaining  47 do
not. Our database helps alert one to some of these types of potential  pitfalls when comparing
variables across countries  and hence to avoid drawing inappropriate  conclusions.
Table 3 contains summary  information  about selected  variables that we analyze further
below.' 6 It also indicates  the number  of countries  upon which the variables are based. Lastly, it
groups  and aggregates  (after quantification  in many cases) the information  into different
headings,  a discussion  of which we now turn.
14 Japan is excluded from this count and the figure. It reports an 8 percent requirement  for international  banks.
15 Japan is excluded from this count and the figure. It reports a ratio of 11.8  percent among internationally  active
banks.
16 Appendix I contains information  on selected other variables  in our database either not mentioned in this paper or
mentioned  only in passing, and Appendix  2 contains a list of the questions  (in abbreviated  form) from the survey.
11III.  Grouping,  Aggregating  and Quantifying  the Data
All the individual  responses  in the survey may be of interest in their own right, especially
for authorities  who want to compare  particular features  of their own banking  system with those
in other countries.  Policy makers who want to know the general direction  in which to proceed
with reforms, such as whether  to emphasize  bank activity restrictions,  capital requirements,  bank
supervision,  or private monitoring,  however,  will appreciate  a greater degree of grouping and
aggregation  (and thus quantification)  of the variables,  as will empirical  researchers  bound by
degrees of freedom  (and a need for quantifiable  variables). It is important  to make clear,
however, that there is no unique grouping  or aggregation  (or even quantification). Further
consideration  on our part and reaction  to comments  received  from others no doubt will lead to
modifications  in the exact variables  put into various groups  and the specific variables that are
aggregated  (or the specific quantification  of variables).
Indeed,  it should be noted at the outset that some of the variables are grouped under one
heading  when they could alternatively  be grouped under another.  A case in point is the Certified
Audit Required  Variable, which indicates  whether or not an external audit by a licensed or
certified auditor is a compulsory  obligation  of banks. We have included  this variable  with the
Private Monitoring  Variables. But to the extent that supervisory  authorities  require and rely upon
such audits this variable  could also be easily viewed as one of the Official Supervisory  Action
Variables. This means that one must not place undue emphasis  at this stage  on the specific
headings under which all the different variables  are listed. That said, the groupings  shown in
Table 3 reflect our judgement  of sensible  ways in which to view the data, knowing full well that
some variables  may actually belong under more than one of the headings, or even a new heading
not yet listed.
12To assist the reader in better understanding  the meaning and interpretation  of the specific
variables indicated in Table 3 , we now attempt  to explain more fully  their construction,
quantification  and importance. This is done by following  the order in which the variables are
listed in the table.
1. Bank Activity Regulatory Variables. There are three regulatory variables  that affect
important  activities in which banks may engage. The three variables involve securities,
insurance and real estate activities. We specifically  measure  the degree to which the
national  regulatory authorities  in countries  allow banks to engage in the following  three fee-
based rather than more traditional  interest spread-based  activities:
(a) Securities:  the ability  of banks to engage in the business  of securities  underwriting,
brokering,  dealing, and all aspects  of the mutual fund industry.
(b) Insurance: the ability  of banks to engage in insurance  underwriting  and selling.
(c) Real Estate:  the ability  of banks  to engage in real estate investment,  development,
and management.
The World Bank and OCC surveys  provided  information  in response  to a series of
individual  questions regarding  each country's regulations  concerning  these activities. Using
this information,  we quantified  the degree of regulatory  restrictiveness  for each aggregate or
composite activity on a scale from 1 to 4, with larger  numbers representing  greater
restrictiveness. The definitions  of the 1 through 4 designations  are as follows:
(1) Unrestricted  - A full range of activities in the given category can be conducted
directly in the bank.
(2) Permitted  - A full range of activities can be conducted,  but all or some must be
conducted in subsidiaries.
(3) Restricted  - Less than a full range of activities  can be conducted in the bank or
subsidiaries.
(4) Prohibited  - The activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries.
The difference  between a I and 2 indicates  only the locations in which the activity may
be conducted,  not whether the activity is restricted  in any way. This type of difference,
13however, may matter for various measures  of banking  industry  performance  as well as bank
stability. Indeed,  there has been considerable  controversy  over which organizational
structure  is most appropriate  for different bank activities  to better ensure a safe and sound
banking industry. More generally,  these  types of regulations  determine  the degree  to which
a bank may diversify its business  operations  as well as to attempt to capitalize  on any
synergies that may arise from complimentary  activities.  17 Figure 1, which was mentioned
earlier, shows the variation  among  countries with respect to the degree to which each of
these three activities is restricted.
2. Mixing Banking / Commerce  Regulatory Variables. We constructed  two aggregate
variables to measure the degree  of regulatory restrictiveness  on the mixing of banking  and
commerce. We once again quantified  the regulatory  restrictiveness  for each variable on a
scale from 1  to 4. The specific variable  definitions  and the definitions  of the 1-4
designations  are as follows:  18
(a) Nonfinancial  Firms Owning  Banks:  the ability of nonfinancial  firms to own and
control banks.
(1) Unrestricted  - A nonfinancial  firm may own 100  percent of the equity in a bank.
(2) Permitted  - Unrestricted  with prior authorization  or approval.
(3) Restricted  - Limits are placed on ownership,  such as a maximum  percentage  of a
bank's capital or shares.
(4) Prohibited  - No equity investment  in a bank.
(b) Banks Owning  Nonfinancial  Firms:  the ability  of banks to own and control
nonfinancial  firms.
(1) Unrestricted  - A bank may own 100 percent of the equity in any nonfinancial
firm.
(2) Permitted  - A bank may own 100  percent of the equity in a nonfinancial  firm,
but ownership  is limited based on a bank's equity  capital.
'1 It should be noted that this particular quantification  required  judgement on the part of the authors taking into
account  information  in the two surveys  as well as information  obtained  from follow-up questions  and the Institute of
International  Bankers.
"Ibid.
14(3) Restricted  - A bank can only acquire less than 100  percent of the equity in a
nonfinancial  firm.
(4) Prohibited  - A bank may not acquire any equity investment  in a nonfinancial
firm.
These particular  regulations  are quite important  and, needless to say, controversial.
As Figure I shows,  many countries freely allow for the cross-ownership  of shares betwee  n
banks and commercial  firms. The regulation  regarding  the extent to which a bank may own
shares in a nonfinancial  firm clearly  affects the ability  of a bank to diversify  its revenue
stream and is therefore  similar in some ways to the regulatory  restrictions on its activities as
described  above. For this reason, we also combine  this particular  regulation  with the three
activity regulations  to create an overall restrictiveness  variable,  which ranges in value from
I to 4, and its variation across countries  is shown in Figure 6, as mentioned  earlier.  The
higher values, as in the case discussed  earlier,  indicate greater restrictiveness.
3. Competition  Regulatory Variables. There are three variables that qualitatively  capture
the extent to which competition  within  the banking industry  is restricted. The variables all
relate to the ability of existing or new banks to enter the banking  business. More
specifically,  the three variables  are defined and quantified  as follows:  19
(a) Limitations on Foreign Ownership  of Domestic Banks: whether there are any
limitations  placed on the ownership  of domestic  banks by foreign banks. If there are any
restrictions,  this variable is assigned a value of 1 and a value of 0 otherwise.
(b) Limitations  on Foreign Bank Entry:  whether  there are any limitations  placed on the
ability of foreign  banks to enter the domestic  banking industry. If there are any
restrictions,  this variable  is assigned a value of 1 and a value of 0 otherwise.
(c) Entry into Banking  Requirements:  whether  there are specific legal submissions
required to obtain a license to operate as a bank. We considered  different types of
submissions  that could potentially  be considered  by the banking authorities  when
deciding  upon whether  or not to grant a license. These are as follows:
(1)  Draft by-laws. Of 106 countries, 100 say yes and 6 say no.
(2)  Intended  organizational  chart. Of 107 countries, 102 say yes and 5 say no.
(3)  First 3-year financial  projections.  Of 107 countries, 102 say yes and 5 say nc.
9 The first two variables  are obtained from the OCC survey.
15(4)  Financial information  on main potential shareholders.  Of 107 countries, 101 say
yes and 6 say no.
(5)  Background/experience  of future  directors.  Of 107  countries, 106 say yes and I
says  no.
(6)  Background/experience  of future managers.  Of 106  countries, 97 say yes and 9
say no.
(7)  Sources  of funds  to be used to capitalize  the new bank. Of 105 countries,  91 say
yes and 14 say no.
(8)  Intended  differentiation  of new bank from other banks. Of 105 countries, 84 say
yes and 21 say no.
Each of these types of submissions  was assigned a value of 1 if it was required and a
value of 0 otherwise. This means that the more information  required  by the regulatory
authorities  of the type indicated  when deciding  upon whether  or not to issue a license, the
more restrictive  will be entry into banking. The Entry into Banking Requirements
variable  is created  by adding  these eight variables  together. It therefore may range in
value from 0 to 8, with higher values  indicating  more restrictiveness. The higher the
score presumably  the more entry into banking  would be restricted  because there are more
grounds  for rejecting a license request.  The higher  the score, moreover,  presumably  the
greater the quality of the new entrants and therefore  the less likely a banking crisis and
the bigger  the overall enhancement  in bank performance.
More generally,  the variables  relating  to regulations  regarding  the ability of foreign  banks to
enter the banking  business  within a country are quite important  for capturing the competitive
environment. Foreign bank entry through branches may have different effects on a banking
industry,  the overall financial system,  or even bank fragility  than entry through the
acquisition  of domestic  banks. It may therefore be worthwhile  to consider  each of these
variables separately  in any empirical work.
4. Capital  Regulatory Variables. It is widely agreed that regulatory requirements  on the
magnitude  of capital and its relationship  to total assets may be important  in understanding
bank performance  and bank fragility  as well as the overall development  of the banking
industry. These are, of course, different ways of measuring  the importance  of capital
requirements  on various financial and economic  outcomes  deemed to be important. We
have compiled alternative  quantitative  measures  of capital regulatory stringency  based upon
the survey information  to indicate  the way in which our database may be used. Specifically,
16there are four different capital regulatory  variables  that capture different  but complementary
measures  of the stringency  of regulatory  capital requirements  across  countries. The specific
measures are as follows:
(a) Overall  Capital Stringency:  whether  there are explicit regulatory  requirements
regarding the amount of capital that a bank must have relative to various guidelines. We
consider several guidelines  to determine  the degree  to which the leverage  potential for
capital is limited. These are as follows:
(1)  Does the minimum  required capital-to-asset  ratio conform  to the Basle
guidelines?  Of 107 countries, 100 say yes and 7 say no.
(2)  Does the minimum  ratio vary with market risk? Of 105 countries,  24 say yes and
81 say no.
(3)  Is the market value of loan losses deducted  from reported accounting  capital?
Of 104  countries, 57 say yes and 47 say no.
(4)  Are unrealized losses in the securities  portfolio  deducted from reported
accounting  capital? Of 104  countries, 60 say yes and 44 say no.
(5)  Are unrealized  foreign  exchange losses deducted from reported accounting
capital? Of 102 countries,  62 say yes and 40 say no.
We assign a value of 1 to each of the above questions if the answer is yes and a 0
otherwise. In addition, we assign a value of I if the fraction of revaluation gains that is
allowed  to count as regulatory  capital is less than 0.75. Otherwise,  we assign a value of
0. By adding together these variables  we create  the variable Overall Capital Stringency.
It ranges in value from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating  greater stringency.  Notice
that this particular  measure of capital stringency  is to some degree capturing whether or
not regulatory capital is solely  an accounting  concept or at least partially a market-value
concept. Figure 11 shows the variation among  countries for this variable.
(b) Initial Capital Stringency:  whether  the source of funds counted as regulatory capital
can include assets other  than cash or government  securities  and borrowed  funds as well as
whether  the sources are verified by the regulatory  or supervisory  authorities. More
specifically,  the following  three questions were asked:
(1)  Can initial and subsequent infusions  of regulatory  capital include assets other
than cash or government  securities?  Of 102  countries,  45 say yes and 57 say no.
(2)  Can the initial infusion of capital be based on borrowed funds? Of 101 countries,
34 say yes and 67 say no.
(3)  Are the sources of funds  that count as regulatory capital verified by the
regulatory or supervisory  authorities? Of 105 countries, 86 say yes and 19 say
no.
For those questions that are answered yes, we assign a value of 1. Otherwise, values of 0
are assigned. This means that when adding these three variables together our newly
17created  variable may range from a low of 0 to a high of 3, with a higher  value indicating
less stringency.
(c)  Capital  Regulatory Index: is simply  the sum of the previous two measures  of
capital stringency. It therefore may range in value from 0 to 9, with a higher value
indicating  greater stringency.  Figure 12 shows  the variation  among countries for this
variable.
(d) Maximum  Capital  Percentage  by Single Owner:  the maximum  allowable
percentage  ownership  of a bank's capital by a single owner. This variable may reach 100
percent if there is no maximum  set by the regulatory/supervisory  authorities.  Many
countries  have limits, perhaps reflecting concerns  about a dominant owner gaining  too
much control at the expense  of minority interests.
5.  Official  Supervisory  Action Variable. The four types of variables discussed so far are
regulatory  variables. These variables basically  implement  various laws that define a bank in
terms of what it takes to enter banking,  who may own a bank, how much is required and what
counts as regulatory capital, and what encompasses  the businesses  of banking. Once a bank
is operating  within the regulatory environment,  it is subject  to monitoring and control
through and by various official supervisory  actions. We now describe  the various variables
that we have constructed from the survey responses  to capture quantitatively  the degree to
which supervisory  authorities may intervene  to promote  a "safe and sound" banking
industry.
(a) Official Supervisory  Power:  whether  the supervisory  authorities  have the authority
to take specific actions to prevent and correct  problems. This variable is based upon yes
or no responses  to the following  16 questions:
(1)  Can supervisors  meet with any external  auditors  to discuss  their reports without
bank approval? Of 107 countries,  78 say yes and 29 say no.
(2)  Are auditors legally  required  to report any misconduct  by managers or directors
to the supervisory  authorities?  Of 107 countries,  65 say yes and 42 say no.
(3)  Can the supervisory  authorities  take legal action against external  auditors for
negligence? Of 107 countries,  55 say yes and 52 say no.
(4)  Can the supervisory  authorities  force a bank to change its internal organizational
structure? Of 107  countries, 78 say yes and 29 say no.
18(5)  Can the deposit  insurance  agency take legal action against bank directors or
officers? Of 59 countries,  20 say yes 39 say no.20
(6)  Are off-balance  sheet items disclosed  to the supervisory  authorities?  Of 106
countries, 104 say yes and 2 say no.
(7)  Does failure to abide by a cease-desist  type order lead to the automatic
imposition  of civil and penal sanctions  on the directors  and managers of a bank?
Of 102 countries,  63 say yes and 39 say no.
(8)  Can the supervisory  authorities  order a bank's directors/managers  to provide
provisions  to cover actual or potential losses?  Of 102 countries,  88 say yes and
14 say no.
(9)  Can the supervisory  authorities  suspend  the directors' decision to distribute
dividends? Of 106 countries,  84 say yes and 22 say no.
(10) Can the supervisory  authorities  suspend  the directors' decision to distribute
bonuses? Of 103 countries,  62 say yes and 41 say no.
(11) Can the supervisory  authorities  suspend  the directors' decision  to distribute
management  fees? Of 103 countries,  54 say yes and 49 say no.
(12) Can the supervisory  authorities  supercede  shareholder  rights and declare a bank
insolvent? Of 101  countries, 74 say yes and 27 say no.
(13) Can the supervisory  authorities  suspend some or all ownership  rights of a
problem bank? Of 103 countries,  85 say yes and 18 say no.
(14) Regarding  bank restructuring  and reorganization,  can the supervisory  authorities
supercede shareholder  rights? Of 102 countries,  81 say yes and 21 say no.
(15) Regarding  bank restructuring  and reorganization,  can the supervisory  authorities
remove and replace management? Of 105 countries,  94 say yes and 11 say no.
(16) Regarding bank restructuring  and reorganization,  can the supervisory  authorities
remove and replace  directors? Of 105  countries,  91 say yes and 14 say no.
The answers  to these 16 questions collectively  constitute  our measure of Official
Supervisory  Power. We specifically  assign a value of 1 to a "yes" answer and a value
of 0 to a "no" answer. This variable is the sum of these assigned values and therefore
may range from 0 to 16, with a higher value indicating  more power. Figure 13 shows
the variation among  countries for this variable.  We also decompose  this variable into
three constituent  parts. The resulting  three variables are as follows:
[1] Prompt Corrective  Action:  whether a law establishes  pre-determined
levels of bank solvency  deterioration  which forces automatic enforcement
actions such as intervention. 2'  If this is indeed  the case, we assign a value
of 1; 0 otherwise. We then multiply  this by (4), (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11)
as described  immediately  above. The Prompt Corrective  Action variable
may therefore range from 0 to 6, with a higher value indicating  more
20 Cambodia  answered no to this question,  while reporting having  no explicit deposit insurance scheme.
21 The specific survey question asks: "Does the Law establish pre-determined  levels of solvency  deterioration  which
forces automatic actions (like intervention)?"  This question  is also used below in the Supervisory  Forbearance
Discretion  variable,  which some may view as a "negative"  Prompt Corrective  Action variable.  It should also be
noted that the labeling of the latter variable may be somewhat  misleading  because some of the variables employed
in its construction are based upon the authority  to engage in an action rather than the action being mandatory.
19promptness in responding  to problems.  Figure 14 shows the variation
among countries for this variable.
[2] Restructuring  Power:  whether  the supervisory  authorities  have the power
to restructure  and reorganize  a troubled bank. This variable is simply  the
sum of(14), (15) and (16) as described  above. It may range in value from
a low of 0 to a high of 3, with a higher value indicating  more power.
Figure 15 shows the variation  among  countries for this variable.
[3] Declaring Insolvency  Power: whether  the supervisory  authorities  have
the power to declare  a deeply troubled  bank insolvent. This variable is
simply  the sum of (12) and (13) as described  above. It may range in value
from 0 to 2, with a higher value indicating  greater power. Figure 16 shows
the variation  among countries  for this variable.
(b) Supervisory  Forbearance  Discretion:  Even when authorized,  supervisory
authorities  may engage in forbearance  when confronted  with violations of laws or
regulations or with other imprudent  behavior on the part of banks. To capture the degree
to with this type of discretion is allowed,  we constructed  a variable  based on the
following  questions:
(1)  Regarding  bank restructuring  and reorganization,  can the supervisory  authorities
or any other government  agency forbear  certain prudential  regulations?  Of 101
countries,  84 say yes and 17 say no.
(2)  Are there pre-determined  levels of solvency  deterioration  that force automatic
actions, such as intervention?  Of 104 countries,  49 say yes and 55 say no.
(3)  Must infractions  of any prudential  regulations  be reported? Of 104  countries,
103 say yes and 1 says no.
(4)  With respect  to (3), are there any mandatory  actions to be taken in these cases?
Of 103 countries,  81 say yes and 22 say no.
We assign a value of 1 when the answer is no and a value of 0 otherwise,  except for (1) in
which case the reverse is done for purposes  of the variable being constructed  here. This
variable is calculated  as the sum of these assigned  values. It may therefore range in value
from 0 to 4, with a higher  value indicating  more discretion.  Figure 17 shows the variation
among countries for this variable.
(c) Loan Classification  Stringency. This variable  measures  the degree to which loans
that are in arrears must be classified as sub-standard,  doubtful,  or loss. More specifically,
we were provided with the actual  number or a range  of days beyond which a loan would
be put into one of these three classifications. We simply  summed  the minimum  numbers
provided across the three classifications  so that higher  values of this variable indicate less
stringency.
(d) Provisioning  Stringency. This variable  measures  the degree to which a bank must
provision as a loan is classified  first as sub-standard,  then as doubtful,  and lastly as loss.
We have been provided  with the minimum  percentage  of the loan for which provisioning
must be provided as a loan progresses  through each of the three problem loan
classifications. We therefore sum the minimum  required provisioning  percentages  when
20a loan is successively  classified as sub-standard,  doubtful,  and loss. This sum is then the
value of our variable Provisioning  Stringency,  with higher values indicating  more
stringency.
(e) Liquidity  / Diversification  Index. It was decided to include a variable capturing the
degree to which banks are encouraged  or restricted  with respect to liquidity  as well as
asset and geographical  diversification. In particular,  our variable or index was based on
the following  three questions:
(1)  Are there explicit, verifiable,  and quantifiable  guidelines for asset
diversification?  Of 107  countries,  38 say yes and 69 say no.
(2)  Are banks prohibited  from making loans abroad?  Of 106 countries, 15 say yes
and 91 sayno.
(3)  Is there a minimum liquidity  requirement?  Of 103  countries, 77 say yes and 26
say no.
On the basis of "yes or no" answers  to these questions,  we calculated  a Liquidity  /
Diversification  Index. A value of 1 was assigned  to yes, except in the case of question
(2) where a 1 was assigned  to no since  this response  is associated  with greater
diversification.  These three values are summed  and may range in value from 0 to 3, with
a higher value indicating  greater liquidity  and diversification.
6.  Official  Supervisory  Resource Variables. It is, of course, important  to know the officia  l
actions that the supervisory  authorities  are required  or may take in response to various
banking situations. But it is also important  to know the official  supervisory  resources
available to take these actions. More specially,  we attempt  to measure  the "quantity and
quality" of bank supervision. This is done on the basis of 5 variables. We also recognize that
it is important  to know the degree  to which the supervisory  authorities  are independent  and
therefore include a variable  to capture such independence.  All these variables are as follows:
(a) Supervisors  per Bank: This variable  is the number  of professional  bank supervisors
per bank. Figure 7 shows the variation  among  countries, as mentioned  earlier.
(b) Bank Supervisor  Years per Bank: This variable is the total number  of years for all
professional  bank supervisors  per bank.
(c) Supervisor  Tenure: This variable  is the average years of tenure of professional  bank
supervisors. 22 Figure 18 shows  the variation  among  countries for this variable.
22 An attempt  was made to obtain data on the ratio of bank supervisory  salaries (at entry, on average, with 10 years
experience,  and the maximum)  relative  to estimates  of private bankers'  compensation,  but the latter were either most
unavailable  or difficult  to obtain with any degree  of confidence.  Thus the "turnover"  variable is the  best
approximation--but  still a slippery one -- to the incentives  that supervisors  face, in addition  to information  on
supervisory  independence  and prompt  corrective action requirements.
21(d) Onsite Examination  Frequency:  This variable  is the frequency  of onsite
examinations  conducted in large and medium size banks, with 1 denoting yearly, 2
denoting  every 2 years, and so on.
(e) Likelihood  Supervisor  Moves into Banking: This variable is the fraction of
supervisors  employed  by the banking  industry subsequent  to retirement, with 0 denoting
never, 1 denoting rarely, 2 denoting  occasionally,  and 3 denoting frequently. Figure 19
shows the variation  among countries  for this variable.
(f)  Independence  of Supervisory  Authority:  This variable  measures  the degree to
which the supervisory  authority  is independent.  It is based upon the following  three
questions:
(1) How is the head of the supervisory  agency (and other directors)  appointed?
(2) To whom are the supervisory  bodies responsible  or accountable?
(3) How is the head of the supervisory  agency (and other directors)  removed?
Depending  upon the answers  to these questions,  especially  the last, the degree of
independence  is rated as 1 for low independence,  2 for medium independence,  and 3 for
high independence. 23
7.  Private Monitoring Variables. Bank behavior  clearly is circumscribed  by various
regulations and supervisory  actions as indicated  above. But it is also affected by private
market forces. It is therefore important  to try to capture to some degree the extent to which
market or private "supervision"  exists in different  countries.  To this end, we constructed and
quantified  five different measures of this type of variable  using information  from the survey
and based essentially  on information  that is disclosed  and thus available to the public. These
measures  are as follows:
(a) Certified  Audit Required:  This variable  captures  whether an external  audit is
required  of the financial  statements  of a bank and, if so, by a licensed or certified auditor.
Such an audit would presumably  indicate  the presence  or absence of an independent
assessment  of the accuracy  of financial  information  released to the public. If both factors
exist a 1 is assigned;  0 otherwise.
(b) Percent of 10 Biggest Banks  Rated by International  Rating  Agencies: The
percentage  of the top 10 banks  that are rated by international  credit rating agencies. The
greater the percentage,  the more  the public may be aware of the overall condition of the
banking  industry as viewed by an independent  third party.
(c) Accounting  Disclosure and Director Liability:  Whether the income statement
includes accrued or unpaid interest or principal  on nonperforming  loans and whether
banks are required to produce  consolidated  financial statements,  including  nonbank
23  For example, Canada was assigned a 3 because  the head or  "The  superintendent  can only be removed for cause. If
removed, a report disclosing  such reasons must be tabled in parliament."  Some also responded  flatly that "The
Governor cannot  be dismissed during his original or renewed  period of appointment"  or can only be removed  for
specified cause and with parliamentary  approval.
22financial affiliates  or subsidiaries. The release of this type of information  or its absence
affects the ability of private agents  to monitor  and hence influence  bank behavior.  Also,
whether bank directors'  are legally liable if information  disclosed is erroneous or
misleading.  If all three factors  exist a I is assigned;  0 otherwise.
(d) No Explicit Deposit  Insurance Scheme: This variable  takes a value of I if there is
no explicit deposit  insurance scheme  and if depositors  were not wholly compensated  the
last time a bank failed, and 0 otherwise.  A higher  value would indicate more private
monitoring.
(e) Private Monitoring  Index: the sum of (a), (b) [which equals I if the percentage is
100; 0 otherwise],  (c), and (d). In addition, three other measures are included in the index
based on 'yes or no' answers. Specifically,  a I is assigned if off-balance  sheet items are
disclosed  to the public; a I if banks must disclose  risk management  procedures  to the
public; and a 1 if subordinated  debt is allowable  (required)  as a part of regulatory capital.
This variable  therefore ranges from 0 to 7, with higher values indicating  more private
oversight.  Figure 20 shows the variation  among  countries for this variable.
8.  Deposit Insurance Scheme Variables. Regulations  and supervisory  practices clearly are
important  parts of a banking  system .But they do not operate in a vacuum. Instead, their
effect on various economic  outcomes  may depend importantly  on the existence  (or lack
thereof) and features  of a country's deposit insurance  scheme. We therefore construct  or
rely on five different quantitative  variables  to capture the type of the deposit insurance
regime a country has chosen to adopt.  These are as follows:
(a) Deposit  Insurer Power:  This variable is based on the assignment  of 1 (yes) or 0 (no)
values to three questions assessing  whether  the deposit insurance  authority has the
authority  to make the decision  to intervene  in a bank, to take legal action against bank
directors  or officials, or has ever taken any legal action against bank directors or officers.
The sum of the assigned values ranges from 0 to 3, with higher values indicating  more
power.
(b) Extra Deposit Insurance  Coverage:  captures  whether  any deposits not covered at
the time of a bank failure were nonetheless  compensated.  If so, it takes on a value of 1.
and is 0 otherwise. Of 45 countries, 16 say yes and 29 say no.
(c) Deposit Insurance  Payout Delay: the average  time in months that it takes to pay
depositors of a failed bank in full (the latter being defined by the amount covered in
relevant statutes).
(d) Deposit Insurance  Funds-to-Total  Bank Assets:  the size of the deposit insurance
fund relative to total bank assets. In the case of the U.S. savings  and loan debacle during
the 1  980s, the insurance  agency itself reported  insolvency.  This severely limited its
ability to effectively  resolve failed savings  and loan institutions in a timely manner. In
weak institutional  environments,  inadequate  funds could  actually increase inappropriate
behavior of banks.
23(e) Moral  Hazard Index: based on DemirgUic-Kunt  and Detragiache  (2000),  who used
principal components  to capture the presence and design features of explicit deposit
insurance  systems,  with the latter including no coinsurance,  foreign currency  deposits
covered, interbank deposits covered,  type of funding,  source of funding,  management,
membership,  and the level of explicit coverage.  The higher  the value, the greater is moral
hazard.
9.  Market Structure  Indicators
The structure of the banking industry  necessarily  interacts  with regulations,  supervisory  practices
and design features  of a deposit  insurance  scheme to produce  various economic outcomes.  We
note the following  indicators of market structure  available in the survey:
(a) Bank Concentration:  the fraction of deposits held by the five largest  banks. Figure 3
shows the variation  among countries  for this variable,  as mentioned  earlier.
(b) Foreign Bank Ownership:  the fraction of the banking  system's assets that are 50%
or more foreign  owned. Figure 5 shows the variation  among  countries for this variable,  as
mentioned  earlier.
(c) Government-Owned  Banks:  the fraction of the banking  system's assets that are
50% or more government  owned.  Figure 4 shows the variation among  countries for this
variable, as mentioned  earlier.
(d) Number of New Banks:  number of applications  approved.
(1)  New Domestic  Banks: number  of applications  approved.
(2)  New Foreign Banks:  number  of applications  approved.
(e) No Entry Applications:  whether  any applications  for banking  licenses, with a
positive number  assigned a 1; 0 otherwise.
(1)  No Domestic  Applications:  whether any applications  for domestic banking
licenses,  with a positive number  assigned a 1; 0 otherwise.
(2)  No Foreign  Applications:  whether  any applications  for banking licenses,  by
foreign entities,  with a positive number  assigned a 1; 0 otherwise.
(f) Fraction  of Entry Applications  Denied: fraction of applications  denied.
(1)  Foreign Denials:  fraction of foreign applications  denied.
(2)  Domestic  Denials: fraction of domestic applications  denied.
Figures 21, 22, and 23 shows the variation  among  countries for these latter three
variables.
We conclude by re-emphasizing  that these particular  groupings  and aggregations  (as well
as quantification)  are not unique,  and they refer not only to our judgement but to the rules more
than the implementation. 24 The Private Monitoring  Index, for example,  may not comport with
24 Our database  contains informnation  on the extent to which authorities  actually  enforce given regulations or use the
powers with which they were endowed.
24everyone's priors regarding  individual  country rankings. In this regard it must be remembered
that the value assigned  to the U.S. as compared  to other countries  reflects the responses  of
countries,  and not necessarily reality as perceived  by those studying it. In any event, as we have
noted,  there is, of course, an important  difference  between  regulations and practices.
We attempt to account for divergences  between  what the regulations  say and what the
authorities  do. For example,  we have information  as to whether  the supervisory  authorities  or any
other government  agency can forbear  prudential  regulations  regarding bank restructuring  and
reorganization---  of 101 countries,  84 say yes and 17 say no. As another example,  we also know
whether infractions of any prudential  regulation  found by a supervisor  must be reported.
Furthermore,  we know whether  there are any mandatory actions  in such cases, and if so, who, if
anyone,  is authorized  to grant exceptions.  Lastly, we know in some cases how many, if any,
exceptions  were actually granted and who authorized  them. This information  is presented in
Table 4. It shows that most countries  require that infractions  be reported and have mandatory
actions in such cases. The table shows,  more generally,  that there are indeed instances in which
rules and regulations  may not tell the whole story about  what goes on in a country.  It is for this
reason that some of the variables included in our database  may help to assess the "credibility"  of
stated or formal regulations  and supervisory  practices.
A final point is that while it would be important  to have information  for the variables in
our database for a lengthy  period of time, the data simply  do not exist for the countries  that
responded to our surveys,  and we have found it impossible  to backdate  our information  for all
the variables. In no small part, this is because of changes  of the governments  in countries,
changes  even in the borders and number of countries,  and a fundamental  re-orientation  of bank
regulation  and supervision  since the 1980s. In any event, in an earlier study Barth, Caprio ard
Levine (2000) found evidence  that the specific regulatory  powers accorded  to banks for many
25countries  appeared to change relatively little from the 1970s  until quite recently. This is
probably also true of supervisory  practices, for which it may take a long time to effect
meaningful  change. Efforts will be made, however,  to obtain more information  on the regulation
and supervision  of banks over time for countries.
IV.  Characterizing the Data
A. Differences Among Countries by Income Level and Development Status
Table 5 presents information  on our variables  when the countries are grouped by income
level and development  status.21  Some of the more interesting  differences  among countries  when
grouped in this way are as follows:
*  There is a clear trend for the restrictiveness of bank activities to decline as one moves
from the lower income countries to the higher income countries. It is generally  the
case, however, that real estate activities are more restricted  than securities or
insurance activities in countries  regardless  of income level.
*  Countries  at all income levels on average  place fewer restrictions  on non-financial
firms owning banks than vice versa. More generally,  the least restricted  activity or
cross-ownership  arrangement  is the ownership  of banks by non-financial  firms among
lower income countries.
*  Developing  countries  place more limitations  on foreign  bank ownership  of domestic
banks and foreign bank entry  through branching  than developed countries.
*  The maximum  percentage  ownership  of a bank's capital is higher among higher
income countries  than lower income countries.
*  The stringency  of capital requirements  is lower for lower income countries  than for
upper income countries. This is the case for all the three measures  of capital
regulatory  stringency.
*  The overall power of the official supervisory  authorities  to take action is generally  the
same in countries  across all four income levels.  The Prompt Corrective  Action
variable,  however, is lower for higher income countries  than lower income countries
and for developed countries  as compared to developing  countries or emerging market
economies.
*  The stringency  of loan classification  is lower for lower income countries than higher
income countries,  but the reverse holds with respect to the stringency of
provisioning.26
25  See appendix  3 for the list of countries  by geographical  region, income level and development  status.
26  Although  provisioning  may be understandably  lower in richer countries  to the extent that the collection rate is
superior,  there was substantial  under-reporting  for this variable among higher income countries  compared  to all the
26*  The independence  of the supervisory  authority is lower in developing countries  than
in developed  countries.
*  The number  of supervisors  per bank is more than three times greater in developing
countries  than in developed  countries.
*  The degree of private monitoring increases  as one moves from lower income
countries to high income countries.
*  Both bank concentration  and foreign  bank ownership are essentially  invariant  to
which of the four income categories  countries are placed.
*  Government  ownership  of banks increases in countries on average as one moves from
the high income level to the lower income level.
*  The fraction of entry  applications  denied, including  both domestic and foreign,  are
quite different in countries across the four income level categories,  with the highest
rejection rates being in lower income countries.
*  Lastly,  as compared  to other groupings,  banks in offshore  centers display the highest
degree of foreign ownership,  highest fraction of domestic entry applications  denied,
and least degree of supervisory  authority independence.
B. Differences  Among Countries  by Geographical  Region
Table 6 shows the difference  in the averages  for our variables in countries  when they are
grouped by geographical  region. While clearly there are differences  across regions, some of the
more striking  and uniform differences  are for the European Union (EU) countries and the South
Asian countries.  First, the EU countries are uniformly  the less restrictive  when it comes to
securities, insurance  and real estate activities,  bank ownership  of nonfinancial firms, and
nonfinancial  firm ownership  of banks. Second,  the EU countries  place no limitations on foreign
bank entry in contrast  to other regional groupings.  Third,  the EU countries display  the greatest
stringency  as regards capital regulation.  Fourth, the EU countries have the fewest supervisors  per
bank. Fifth, the EU countries  display  the greatest degree of independence  with respect  to the
supervisory  authority. Sixth, both foreign-bank  ownership  and government-bank  ownership are
the lowest in the EU countries as compared  to the other groupings.
other income categories. Also, Cavallo and Majnoni  (2000) show  that whereas  industrial countries  build up
provisions  in good times and draw them down as the business  cycle weakens,  there was no such variation  in the
developing  countries  in their sample.
27South Asian countries,  in contrast  to the EU countries,  are the most restrictive  with
respect to the ownership of banks by nonfinancial  firms. These countries  also place the most
limitations  on foreign  bank entry, with the East Asian and Pacific countries a close second. The
South Asian countries  have the highest number  of supervisors  per bank, again with the East
Asian and Pacific countries not far behind. In addition, the South  Asian countries  have the lowest
value for the Private Monitoring  Index and the highest value for the Moral Hazard Index. Lastly,
these countries have nearly the lowest percentage  of foreign  bank ownership,  while
simultaneously  having  the highest percentage  of government-bank  ownership.
C. Correlations  in Variables  from Our Database
To create a better understanding  of the data, we calculated  the pairwise  Pearson
correlation  coefficients  for all the variables in Table 3. We also assessed  their significance  levels
and found that most of the correlation  coefficients  were not significantly  different from zero.
Here, we focus on those variables  that are generally either significant  or among  the more
important  variables in terms of inter-relationships.  Tables 7a through 7d present these variables
and the associated correlations. We conduct  these correlations  only for countries  with a
population greater than 100,000.
Table 7a shows the correlations  among  the three bank activity restrictiveness  variables
and the two mixing of banking  and commerce  variables.  The three restrictiveness  variables are
all positively  and significantly  correlated  with one another. Two of these variables, moreover,  are
positively and significantly  correlated  with the two cross-ownership  variables. Only insurance
activities are not significantly  correlated  with the ownership  variables.  The two ownership
variables themselves, however, are not significantly  correlated  with each other. Given the
positive and significant  correlations  among  the bank restrictiveness  variables (i.e., banks
28engaging in securities, insurance,  and real estate activities  and banks owing nonfinancial  firms),
it makes sense  to combine them as discussed  earlier into an overall bank restrictiveness  variable.
Table 7b shows the correlations  among some of our regulatory,  supervisory  and deposit
insurance  variables. It may be seen that 17 of the 20 correlations  are not significant.  The bank
activity restrictiveness  variables and the bank ownership  restrictiveness  variables are generally
not significantly  correlated with the Moral Hazard  Index, Private  Monitoring  Index, Official
Supervisory  Power, or Prompt Corrective  Action.  The three exceptions  are securities and
insurance  activities. Both of these variables are negatively  and significantly  correlated  with the
Private Monitoring  Index. Securities  activities, in addition,  are positively  and significantly
correlated  with Prompt Correction  Action.
Table 7c presents the pairwise  correlations  among four of the variables discussed in the
immediately  preceding paragraph:  Moral Hazard Index, Private Monitoring  Index, Official
Supervisory  Power,  and Prompt Corrective  Action. It is not surprising  that Official Supervisory
Power and Prompt Corrective  Action are positively and significantly  correlated insofar as the
latter variable is a component  of the former. What is interesting  is that the Private Monitoring
Index is significantly  correlated  with two of the other variables  and nearly so with the remaining
third variable. It is negatively  and significantly  correlated  with the Moral Hazard Index and
positively and significantly  correlated  with Official Supervisory  Power. It is positive and nearly
significantly  correlated  with Prompt Corrective  Action.  These latter  two findings  may be
interpreted  as meaning that supervisory  practices are to some extent embodied within  the private
monitoring  variable.
Table 7d contains information  on the correlations  for 23 other pairs of variables. Perhaps
not surprisingly,  the three supervisory  resource  variables are all positively and significantly
correlated. Perhaps surprisingly,  on the other hand, they are not correlated with Onsite Frequency
29of Examinations.  The two bank entry variables are also positively and significantly  correlated.
The Government  Owned Bank variable  provides some interesting  results. It is positively and
significantly  correlated  with both Limits on Foreign  Bank Entry and Fraction of Entry
Applications  Denied. Furthermore,  it is negatively  and significantly  correlated  with Foreign
Bank Ownership  and the Private Monitoring  Index.
Still other results indicate  that Supervisory  Forbearance  Discretion,  perhaps reassuringly,
is negatively and significantly  correlated  with the Private Monitoring  Index, Declaring
Insolvency  Power,  Loan Classification  Stringency,  and Prompt Corrective  Action.  The Private
Monitoring  Index is positively  and significantly  correlated  with Loan Classification  Stringency
and the Capital Regulatory Index. Prompt Corrective  Action is positively and significantly
correlated with both Loan Classification  and Provisioning  Stringency.  Lastly, the Moral Hazard
Index, somewhat  surprisingly,  is not significantly  correlated  with either Deposit Insurance
Authority  Power or Deposit Insurance  Funds-to-Total  Bank Assets.
V. Summary and Conclusions
As authorities  around the world attempt  to decide how best to reform bank regulation  and
supervision,  an important  input should be a thorough understanding  of what other countries do
and eventually  of the implications  of these choices. This paper represents  a key step towards the
first goal. In a companion  paper, we study the relationship  between  bank performance  and
stability  with differences in bank regulations  and supervision  [Barth,  Caprio, and Levine, 20011.
The main conclusions  we draw from this preliminary  research  on performance  and stability are
as follows. First, regulatory and supervisory  strategies  that promote private sector forces work.
Countries  with policies that promote  private monitoring  of banks have better bank performance
and more stability. Furthermore,  countries  with more generous deposit insurance  schemes  tend
30to have poorer bank performance  and greater bank fragility,  which confirms  research by Cull,
Senbet, and Sorge (2000) and Demirgtiu-Kunt  and Detragiache  (2000).  The private sector theme
is reinforced  by our results on government  banks. Government  ownership  is negatively linked
with both bank performance  and stability.
Second, diversification  of income streams  and loan portfolios  also works toward
improving  performance  and stability. We find that diversifying  income streams  - by not
restricting  bank activities - is positively linked  with bank performance  and stability.
Diversifying  income streams, not surprisingly,  works best when there is an active securities
market in which to diversify. Furthermore,  countries  in which banks can - and are encouraged  to
- diversify  their portfolios  domestically  and intemationally  suffer fewer crises. The old adage,
"don't put all your eggs in one basket," still seems relevant for bank regulation in the 215
century.
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Admilnistrative  Structure  of Bank  Supervision  Around  the  World
What body/agency  supervises  banks?  Is there  more  than one  To whom  are supervisory  bodies
supervisory  body  ?  responsible  or accountable?
Argentina  Central Bank of  Argentina  via the Superintendency  of  yes  Central Bank
Financial  and Foreign  Exchange Institutions
Aruba  Central  Bank  of Aruba  no  CBA is independent
Australia  Australian  Prudential  Regulation  Authority;  all banks  are also  yes  Commonwealth  Parliament
subject  to the Corporations  Law administered  and enforced
by the Australian  Securities  and Investments  Commission
(ASIC)
Austria  Ministry  of Finance  no  Parliament
Bahrain  Bahrain Monetary  Agency  no  Board of Directors
Bangladesh  Bangladesh  Bank  no  Government
Belarus  National  Bank  of Belarus  yes  President
Belgium  Banking  & Finance  Commission  no  Minister  of Finance  and Minister  of
Economic  Affair  s
Bhutan  Royal  Monetary  Authority  of Bhutan  no  Central Bank Governor,  Finance
Sectretary,  Finance Minister  and Board of
Directors
Bolivia  Superintendency  of Banks  no  Finance Ministrr
Botswana  Financial  Institutions  Department,  Bank  of Botswana  no  Minster  of Finance and Development
Planning
Brazil  Central Bank  of Brazil  no  Ministry of Finance
British  Virgin  Islands,  The  Banking  Inspectorate,  Financial  Services  Dept.  no  Minister of  Finance
Burundi  Central Bank  Inspection  no  Govemor  of CB
Cambodia  Bank Supervision  of the  National Bank  of Cambodia  no  Govemor  of National  Bank of Cambodia
Canada  OSFI  no  Minister  of Finance
Cayman  Islands  Cayman  Islands  Monetary  Authority  no  Govemor in Council
Chile  Superintendency  of Banks  no  Ministry of Finance
China  People's  Bank of  China  |no  State  Council
Croatia  Croatian  National  Bank  no  Parliament
Cyprus  Bank Supervision  Dept., Central Bank  of Cyprus  no  Board of Directors,  Ministry of Finance,
and President
Czech Republic  Banking  Supevision  of CNB;  Committee  for Securities  (for  yes  Board of  Directors,  CNB
______________  _  |securities  activities)  |
Denmark  Danish  Financial  Supervisory  Authority  no  Ministry  of Economics
Egypt  Central  Bank  of Egypt  no  Central  Bank is an autonomous  authority
El Salvador  Superintendence  of the Financial  System  no  President  and Consress
Estonia  Banking  Supervision  Department  no  Parliament
Finland  Financial  Supervision  Authority  no  Parliament
France  Commission  Bancarre  no  Parliament
Gambia,  The  Central Bank  no  Department  of State for Finance and
Economic  Affairs
Germany  Bundesaufsichtsamt,  with the help of  the Deutsche  yes  Ministry  of Finance
Bundesbank  for a wide range  of supportive  tasks
Ghana  Banking  Supervision  Dept.,  Bank of Ghana  no  Govemor,  Bank of (jhana
Gibraltar  Commissioner  of Banking,  Financial  Services  Commision  yes  Govemor  of Gibraltar  and the UK
Government
Greece  Bank of Greece  no  Parliament
Guatemala  Superintendency  of Banks  no  La Junta Monetaria
Guemsey  Guernsey  -Financial  Services  Commission  no  Goverrment
Guyana  Bank of  Guyana  no  Minister  of Finance
Honduras  National  Commission  of Banks  no  President
Hungary  State  Banking  and Capital  Market  Supervision;  Central  Bank  yes  Ministry  of Finance
of Hungary
Iceland  Financial  Supervisory  Authority  no  Minister  of Commerce
India  Board for Financial  Supervision  (BFS)  no  Reserve  Bank of India
Indonesia  Bank of Indonesia  (starting  from 2002, supervisory  function  no  Parliament
will be transferred  to a new institution)
Ireland  Central Bank  no  Not reported
Israel  Banking  Supervision  Dept, Bank  of Israel  no  Govemor
Italy  Bank of Italy  no  administrative  courts
Jamaica  Central Bank  no  Minister  of FinanceTable  I
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What body/agency  supervises  banks?  Is there  more  than one  To whom are  supervisory  bodies
supervisory  body  ?  responsible  or accountable?
Japan  FSA  is the sole  supervisor  of banks  no  Cabinet,  the Diet and the Public
Jordan  Central Bank  of Jordan  no  Parliament
Kenya  Central  Bank of  Kenya  no  Treasury
Korea,  Rep of.  Banking  Supervisory  Authority  (BSA)  and Financial  yes  Government
Supervisory  Commission;  Ministry  of Finance  and economy
supervises specialized  banks
Kuwait  Central  Bank  of Kuwait  no  Ministry of Finance
Latvia  Bank  of Latvia;  Credit  Institutions  Supervision  Department  yes  Not reported
Lebanon  Banking  Control Commission  no  High Banking  Council headed  by the
Governor  of  the Central  Bank
Lesotho  Central Bank  of Lesotho  (Bank Supervision  Division)  no  Governor/Board  of Directors,  Central
Bank
Liechtenstein  Financial  Services  Authority  no  Prime Minister
Lituania  Supervision  Department,  Bank of Lituania  no  Central Bank  Board, which is accountable
to the Parliament
Luxembourg  Commission  de Surveillance  du Secteur  Financier  (CSSF)  no  Minister of Finance
Macau  Monetary  and Foreign  Exchange  Authority  of  Macau  no  Secretary  for Economy  and Finance
Macedonia  Supervision  Department,  National  Bank  of the Republic  of  no  Parliament
Macedonia
Malawi  Reserve  Bank of Malawi  no  Minister of Finance
Malaysia  Central Bank  ofMalaysia  no  MinisterofFinance
Maldives  Maldives  Monetary  Authority  no  Board of Directors  of MMA
Malta  Central Bank  of Malta  no  Minister  of Finance
Mauritius  Bank of  Mauritius  no  Board of the Bank of Mauritius
Mexico  National Banking  and Securities  Commission  no  Ministry  of Finance
Moldova  Banking  Supervision  and Relation  Department  no  Council of Administration  of  NBM
Morocco  Bank  Al-Maghrib  no  Govemor of Bank Al-Maghrib
Namibia  Central  Bank  no  Ministry  of Finance
Nepal  Inspection  and Supervision  Dept., Nepal Rastra Bank  (CB)  no  Central  Bank
Netherlands  De Nedelandsche  Bank  NV  no  nobody
New Zealand  Reserve  Bank of New  Zealand  no  Treasurer
Nigeria  Central Bank of  Nigeria  (Banking  Supervision  Dept.)  no  Ministry  of Finance
Oman  Central Bank  of Oman  no  Board of Govemors  of CB
Panama  Superintendency  of Banks  no  Superintendency  of Banks  is not
responsible  or accountable  to any other
entity
Peru  Superintendercia  de Barca y Seguros  no  To none according  to the Constitution
Philippines  Central  Bank  of Philippines  no  general  public
Poland  Commission  for Banking  Supervision  yes; there are  different  Accountable  to the Public
supervisors  for other financial
institutions
Portugal  Banco  de Portugal  no  Depositors
Puerto  Rico  Office of the Commission  of Financial  Institutions  yes  Departmento  de Hacienda
Qatar  Qatar  Central Bank  no  Ministry  of Finance
Romania  National Bank  of Romania  no  Board of Directors,  NBR and the
Parliament
Russia  Central Bank  of Russia  Federation  State Duma (Parliament)
Rwanda  Banque  Nacional  du Rwanda  yes  Minister  of Finance
Samoa  (Westem)  Financial  Institutions  Dept, Central  Bank of Samoa  no  Govemor,  CBS
Saudi Arabia  Saudi  Arabian  Monetary  Authority  no  Board of Directors  appointed by the  Govt.
At an institutional  level, to the Minister  of
Finance
Seychelles  Central Bank  of Seychelles  no  Board of Directors;  Govemor  of the
Central Bank
Singapore  Monetary  Authority  of Singapore  no  Govemment
Slovenia  Bank  of Slovenia  no  Parliament
Solomon  Islands  Central  Bank  no  Head  of State
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What body/agency  supervises  banks?  Is there  more  than one  To whom  are supervisory  bodies
supervisory  body  ?  responsible  or accountable?
South  Africa  Office  of Registrar  of Banks/Bank  Supervision  Dept.  no  Central  Bank Govemor  (operationally);
Ministry of Finance  (legally)
Spain  Bank  of Spain  no  All administrative  decisions  of the Banco
de Espana  can be appealed  before the
Ministry  of Finance  (except regulations
which are to be appealed before  the
Courts)
Sri Lanka  Bank  Supervision  Dept.,  Central Bank  of Sri Lanka  no  Monetary  Board comprising  of The
Govemor of  the CB,  Secretary-General  of
the Treasury,  and a Member  appointed  by
the President
St. Kitts  Eastem Caribbean  Central  Bank  for domestic  banks,  no  Monetary  CouncIJ
respective  govts. Supervise  off-shore  banks
Sweden  Finansinspektionen  no  Govemment
Switzerland  Federal  Commission  of Banks (CFB)  no  Parliament  and the govemment
Taiwan  (China)  Central Bank,  Ministry of Finance,  Central Deposit  Insurance  yes  prime  minister
Corporation
Tajikistan  Bank  Supervision  Department  of the National  Bank  of  no  National Bank  of Tajikistan
Tajikistan
Thailand  Ministry  of Finance  and Bank  of Thailand  yes  Ministry of Finance
Tonga  National Reserve  Bank  of Tonga  no  Govemment
Trinidad  & Tobago  Central  Bank  no  Minister  of Finance
Turkey  Central  Bank and Treasury  conduct  supervisory  operations.  yes  Ministry of Finance
The Banks' Regulatory  and Supervisory  Agency  which will
begin operation from  Sept  2000
Turks and Caicos  Islands  Superintendent  of Banking  no  Govemor  and Permanent  Secretary  of
Finance
United  Kingdom  Financial  Services  Authority  Depending  on the type  of  Her  Majesty's  Treasury
United  States  Office  of the Comptroller  of Currency  Depending  whether  the bank  Department  of Treasury
is part of a holding  company
or conducts  securities  or
insurance  activities  in an
operating  subsidiary,  other
supervisors  such as FDIC  or
SEC  may have  some
supervisory authority
Vanuatu  Reserve  Bank of  Vanuatu  -Domestic  Banks;  Financial  yes  Parliament
Services  Commission
Venezuela  Superintendent  of  Banks  and other Financial  Institutions  no  Ministry of Finance
Vietnam  State  Bank Inspectorate  no  Govemor  of the Central Bank (State  Bank
of Vietnam)
Zambia  Bank  of Zambia  no  Ministry of Finance
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(percent)  100,000  People  largest  banks  government  owned  foreign  owned  restrictiveness  per bank  their actions?  scheme  by int'l agencies
Argentina  54  0.3  48  30  49  1.8  2.4  Yes  Yes  100
Aruba  8.7  94  0  77  1.0  1.0  Yes  No  30
Australia  0.3  73  6  17  2.0  2.0  No  No  100
Austria  11.9  38  4  5  1.3  1.0  Yes  Yes  80
Bahrain  186  3.0  71  4  28  2.3  1.5  No  Yes  0
Bangladesh  0.0  65  70  6  3.0  8.0  No  Yes  0
Belarus  0.3  83  67  3  3.3  4.0  No  Yes  30
Belgium  315  1.2  74  2.3  0.7  Yes  Yes  50
Bhutan  0.1  100  60  20  3.5  Yes  No  0
Bolivia  52  0.2  68  0  42  3.0  6.0  Yes  No  20
Botswana  29  0.3  100  2  98  2.5  9.0  No  No  100
Brazil  55  0.1  58  52  17  2.5  4.0  Yes  Yes  100
British  Virgin  Islands  21.1  85  0  100  3.3  4.3  No  100
Burundi  0.1  91  63  0  3.0  1.0  No  No  0
Cambodia  0.3  67  16  71  3.5  No  No  0
Canada  154  0.2  76  0  1.8  No  Yes  100
Cayman  Islands  1,1513  0  98  1.8  0.0  No
Chile  97  0.2  59  12  32  2.8  3.0  Yes  Yes  50
China  0.0  75  3.5  1.0  Yes  No  100
Croatia  1.2  57  37  7  1.8  0.8  Yes  Yes  20
Cyprus  76  1.5  80  3  11  2.0  1.5  No  Yes  27
Czech  Republic  125  0.5  74  19  26  2.0  2.0  Yes  Yes
Denmark  121  3.6  79  0  2.0  0.2  Yes  Yes  40
Egypt  0.0  65  67  4  3.3  8.0  No  No  70
El Salvador  62  0.2  75  7  13  3.3  1.0  Yes  Yes  90
Estonia  59  0.4  95  0  85  2.0  2.5  Yes  Yes  33
Finland  0.2  97  22  8  1.8  0.1  Yes  Yes  100
France  147  0.6  70  0  1.5  Yes  Yes
Gambia  40  0.4  100  0  76  3.5  1.0  Yes  No  0
Germany  313  3.9  12  42  4  13  1.0  No  Yes  100
Ghana  19  0.1  78  38  54  3.0  1.0  No  No  0
Gibraltar  86.2  40  0  100  2.5  6.3  No  Yes
Greece  100  0.2  70  13  5  2.3  1.5  Yes  Yes  50
Guatemala  28  0.3  38  8  5  3.3  2.5  Yes  Yes  0
Guernsey  |  121.5  48  0  100  2.0  0.1  No  No
Guyana  _  1.0  14  19  16  2.3  1.7  Yes  No  0
Honduras  r  0.4  52  1  2  2.3  12.0  No  Yes
Hungary_|  0.4  3  62  2.3  1.0  No  Yes
Iceland  |  1.5  64  0  2.8  Yes  Yes
India  48  0.0  42  80  0  2.5  5.5  No  Yes
Indonesia  101  0.1  53  44  7  3.5  3.0  Yes  Yes  100
Ireland  _  _  1.6  _  2.0  0.3  No  Yes  0
Israel  147  0.4  so80  _  3.3  No  No  50
Italy  150  1.6  25  17  5  2.5  Yes  Yes  I
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Jamaica  74  0.2  94  56  44  3.0  1.4  No  Yes  0
Japan  0.2  31  1  6  3.3  No  Yes  100
Jordan  214  0.4  68  0  68  2.8  3.0  No  No  __  __
Kenya  56  0.2  62  _  2.5  1.0  No  Yes  0
Korea S.  98  0.0  48  30  0  2.3  5.7  No  Yes  100
Kuwait  109  0.4  0  0  2.5  1.4  No  No  100
Latvia  1.0  . 2.0  Yes  ,
Lebanon  2.0  40  0  27  2.8  2.5  Yes  Yes  100
Lesotho  0.1  56  51  49  3.0  2.0  Yes  No  0
Liechtenstein  40.6  90  4  1  2.3  0.5  Yes  Yes  10
Lithuania  0.3  90  44  48  2.3  0.8  No  Yes  40
Luxembourg  48.3  27  5  95  1.5  0.2  Yes  Yes  70
Macau  252  5.0  74  1  12  2.3  3.0  No  No  40
Macedonia  1.1  77  1  93  3.3  0.6  Yes
Malawi  0.1  73  49  8  3.3  1.0  No  No  0
Malaysia  166  0.2  30  0  18  2.5  4.7  No  No  100
Maldives  1.3  75  25  2.5  0.0  No  0
Malta  291  1.3  100  0  49  2.5  2.0  Yes  No  30
Mauritius  96  1.8  91  0  26  3.3  3.0  Yes  No  10
Mexico  30  0.1  80  25  20  3.0  11.5  Yes  Yes
Moldova  25  0.4  71  7  33  1.8  1.1  No  No  0
Morocco  89  0.1  75  24  19  3.3  3.0  No  Yes  40
Namibia  0.3  100  2.8  5.0  No  No
Nepal  32  0.1  55  20  35  2.0  4.0  No  No  0
Netherlands  358  5.1  88  6  1.5  _  No  Yes  30
New Zealand  154  0.5  91  0  99  1.0  0.6  No  No  100
Nigeria  28  0.0  51  13  0  2.3  No  Yes  0
Oman  64  0.7  77  0  11  3.3  3.0  Yes  Yes  100
Panama  386  3.0  30  12  38  2.0  0.6  Yes  No
Peru  36  0.1  81  3  40  2.0  3.6  Yes  Yes  50
Philippines  91  0.1  46  12  13  1.8  7.0  Yes  No  60
Poland  54  0.2  57  44  26  2.5  2.4  No  Yes  80
Portugal  238  0.6  82  21  12  2.3  0.5  Yes  Yes  100
Puerto Rico  0.4  76  0  31  3.5  4.0  No  Yes
Oatar  1.9  76  43  15  2.8  1.0  No  No
Romania  25  0.2  59  70  8  3.3  2.0  Yes  Yes  100
Russia  16  0.9  80  68  9  2.0  2.4  No  No
Rwanda  16  0.1  100  50  50  3.3  1.0  No  No
Saint Kitts  and Nevis  171  102.3  24  21  65  3.3  0.5  . No
Samoa (Western)  ._____  1.3  100  0  93  3.5  1.0  No
Saudi Arabia  93  0.0  69  0  2.8  7.0  Yes  No  IOW
Seychelles  7.6  0  0  2.0  No  No
Singapore  3.9  0  50  2.0  1.0  No  No
Slovenia  66  1.2  64  40  5  2.3  0.2  No  No  70
37Table 2
Some Basic Differences in Banking Systems Around the World
Total bank  Number of  Percent of  deposits  Percent of total  Percent of total  Overall bank activities  Professional  Are supervisors  Explicit deposit  Percent of 10
assets / GDP  banks per  accounted for by 5  bank assets  bank assets  and ownership  supervisors  legally  liable for  insurance  biggest banks rated
(percent)  100,000  People  largest banks  government owned  foreign owned  restrictiveness  per bank  their actions?  scheme  by int'l agencies
Solomon  Islands  0.7  100  10  90  3.3  0.5  No  0
South  Africa  90  0.1  85  0  5  2.0  3.0  No  No  70
Spain  156  0.8  49  0  11  1.8  0.6  Yes  Yes  100
Sri Lanka  0.1  _  55  1.8  No  No
Sweden  129  0.2  0  2  2.3  No  Yes  40
Switzerland  539  5.5  65  15  9  1.3  No  Yes  40
Taiwan  0.2  15  43  3.0  18.0  No  No  100
Tajikistan  9  0.3  7  6  1.5  2.1  Yes  Yes
Thailand  117  0.0  75  31  7  2.3  10.0  Yes  No  90
Tonga  52  2.8  100  0  100  2.5  1.0  No  No
Trinidad  and Tobago  0.5  75  15  8  2.3  6.0  Yes  Yes
Turkey  0.1  50  35  66  3.0  0.4  No  Yes  70
Turks  and Caicos  Islan  6  52.9  100  5  90  2.8  0.1  Yes  No
United  Kingdom  311  0.8  0  1.3  0.7  No  Yes  100
United  States  66  3.9  21  0  5  3.0  0.1  No  Yes  100
Vanuatu  126  2.6  100  10  25  3.5  1.0  No  No
Venezuela  6  0.1  64  5  34  2.5  1.0  No  Yes  40
Vietnam  0.1  65  3.5  3.  0  No
Zambia  0.2  83  23  64  3.3  2.0  No  No  0
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Information on Bank Structural, Regulatory, Supervisory and Deposit Insurance Variables
Number  of countries  Standard  Minimum  Maximum
Variable  providing  Mean  Median  deviation  ivalue  value
information  deviatio  v  value
1. Jank  Ac'vity  Regulatory  Variables
I  (a) Securities  Activities  107  1.87  2.00  0.88  1.00  L 4.00
(b)  Insurance  Activities  107  2.73  2,00  1.00  1.00  J  4.00
I(c)  Rea Estate  Activities  107  2.90  3.00  1.07  1.00  L 4.00
2. Miring Banking/Comtnerce  Regulatory  Variables
l(a) Bank  Ownership  of  Nonfinancial  Firns  107  2.45  |  3.00  0.80  1.00  |  4.00
(b) Nonfinancial  Firm Ownership  of Banks  107  2.04  2.00  0.91  1.00  4.00
3.  Conq,eXion  Regulatory  Varables
_(a)  Limitations  on Foreign  Bank Ownership  of Domestic  Banks  76  0.24  0  000  0.43  0|00  1.00
(b)  Limitations  on  Foreign  Bank  Entry  76  0.13  0,00  0.34  |  0.00  1.00
(cj  Entry  into Bankin  Re uirements  105  J  7.33  8.00  1.09  2.00  J  8.00
4.  Capital Regulatory  Variabks
(a) Overall  Capital  Stinency  105  3.45  4.00  J  1.49  |  1.00  6.00
(b) Initial Capital  Stringency  104  1.56  2.00  0.83  0.00  3.00
(c) Capital  Regulatory  Index  104  4.99  5.00  1.79  1.00  9.00
(d) Maximum  Capital  Percentage  by Single Owner  106  66.93  100.00  40.58  2.00  100.00
5. OfficialSopervisoryAction  VarWabs
(a) Official  Supervisory  Power  105  11.10  12.00  2.76  3.00  16.00
(1)  Prompt  Corrective  Action  105  2.00  0.00  2.43  0.00  6.00
[(2)Restructuring Power  103  2.57  3.00  0.81  0.00  3.00
(b) Supervisory  Forbearance  Discretion  104  1.61  2.00  0.98  0.00  4.00
(c)  Loan Classification  Stringency  60  401.67  41  1.00  390.31  31.00  2,520.00
[(d)  Provisioning  Stringency  105  107.73  160.00  77.33  |  0.00  205.00
_ (e) Liquidity  / Diversification  Index  105  1.93  2.00  0.82  0.00  3,00
6  Offici  Supervisory  Resource  Variables
(a) Supervisors  per Bank  E  92  J2.68  -1.50  3.05  0.00  18.00
|(b) Bank Supervisor  Years  per Bank  73  |  27.22  9.80  47.24  |  0.09  270.00
(c) Supervisor  Tenure  79  7.45  |  6.00  4.87  1.00  25.00
|(d) Onsite Examination  Frequency  |  91  1.53  1.00  0.71  0.50  5.00
(e) LikelihoodSupervisorMovesintoBanking  101  1.82  2.00  0.88  0.00  3,00
(f) Independence  of Supervisory  AuthoritX  103  |  1.71  |  1.00  0  1.00  3.00
Z  Private  Monitoring  Variables
(a) Certified  Audit Required  105  0.93  1.00  0.25  0.00  1.00
(b) Percent  of 10  Biggest Banks  Rated  by International  Rating  Agencies  76  51.58  j  50.00  40.83  0.00  100.00
(c)  Accounting  Disclosure  and Director  Liability  1  97  2.63  3.00  0.56  1.00  3.00
(d) No Explicit Deposit  Insurance  Scheme  J  105  0.40  0.00  0.49  0.00  1.00
(e) Private  Monitoring  Index  106  6.71  7.00  1.65  2.00  11.00
8. Deposit  Insurance  Scheme  Variables
(a) Deposit  Insurer  Power  60  0.73  0.00  |  1.02  0.00  3.00
(b) Extra  Deposit  Insurance  Coverage  46  0.37  0.00  0.49  0.00  1.00
(c) Deposit Insurance  Payout  Delay  |  37  6.71  3.00  1  11.46  0.03  T  60.00
(d)Deposit Insurance  Funds-to-Total  Bank  Assets  39  1.45  0.22  |  5.52  0.00  J  34.70
(e) Moral  Hazard Index  34  0.70  1  .2  |  2.48  -2.49  |  3.98
9. MarketStructure  Inibcators
(a) Bank  Concentration  95  68.26  73.30  22.92  12.00  100.00
(b) Foreign  Bank  Ownership  91  33.13  19.90  32.60  0.00  100.00
(c) Government  Owned Banks  99  19.29  7.61  23.18  0.00  80,00
(d) Number  of New Banks  84  22.69  4.00  109.31|  0.00  999.00
(1) New Domestic  Banks  92  17.22  1.50  104.45  0.00  99600
(2) New Foreign  Banks  88  5.19  1.00  7.96  0.00  3600
(e) No Entry Applications  95  0.09  0.00  0.29  |  0.00  1.00
(1) No Domestic  Applications  96  0.26  0.00  0.44  0.00  1.00
(2) No Foreign  Applications  91  0.26  0.00  0.44  0.00  1.00
(f) Fraction  of Entry  Applications  Denied  75  23.16  6.67  31.54  0o00  100.00
(1) Foreign  Denials  65  2011  0.00  32.95  000  100.00
(2) Domestic  Denials  67  21,12  0.00  30.27  0.00  100.00
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Prudential  Bank  Regmlations  and  Their  Enforcement
Moat infractions  of any  Any mandatory
prudential  regulation  found  by  actions  in these  Who authoriz  exceptions  to sach acffons  m  ts  wer?
a supervisor  be reported?  cases?
Argentina  yes  no  not applicable  not applicable
Aruba  yes  no  not applicable  not applicable
Australia  yes  no  APRA  O
Austria  yes  yes  Supervisory  Authority  0
Bahrain  yes  yes  Governor,  Deputy Governor  few
Bangladesh  yes  no  Head  of Supervisory  Authority  0
Belarus  yes  yes  Board  of National Bank  not available
Belgium  not reported  not reported  not reported  not reported
Bhutan  no  no  Governor  0
Bolivia  yes  yes  No  exceptions  though  banks  have  the provision  to  0
appeal  to the Superintendencia  de Recursos
Jerarquicos
Botswana  yes  yes  Board  of the Bank  of Botswana  0
Brazil  yes  yes  no one
British  Virgin  Islands  yes  yes  Governor  in Council  on recommendations  of the  negligible  and generally  relating  to
Director  of Financial  Services  or  the Inspector  of  minor matters  such as transfer  or small
Banks  shareholding  without prior approval
Burundi  yes  yes  Governor  of CB
Cambodia  yes  yes  Governor  0
Canada  yes  no  not applicable  not applicable
Cayman  Islands  yes  yes  CIMA  not available
Chile  yes  yes  Superintendent  not available
China  yes  yes  Vice Governor  of the People's  Bank  of China  not reported
Croatia  yes  yes  not reported  not reported
Cyprus  yes  yes  Bank Supervision  Department  and the Governor  very few
Czech  Republic  yes  yes  Governor  or head of banking  supervision  or head of  many
_______________  ______________________  ___________  banking  inspection
Denmark  yes  yes  Danish  Financial  Supervisory  Authority  0
Egypt  yis  Centa  Bank of Directors  6
El Salvador  yes  yes  Board of  Directors  of  the Superintendence  not reported
Estonia  yes  yes  Court  0
Finland  yes  yes  FSA,  if it is spulatedin  legislation  24
France  yes  knot  reported  not reported  not reported
Gambia,  The  not reported  no  not reported  not reported
Germanv  yes, intemally  only  no  not reported  not reported
Ghana  yes  yes  Governor  0
Gibraltar  yes  yes  Commissioner  of Banking  0
Greece  yes  yes  A committee  presided  by the Governor  of the Bank  5
of Greece  takes the decision  to impose  sanctions  or
authonze  exceptions
Guatemala  yes  yes  no exceptions  not applicable
Guemsey  yes  no  Commissioners  not reported
Guyana  yes  yes  Governor/Director  of Bank  Supervision  Dept  not available
Honduras  yes  yes  Commision  of Banks  not reported
Hungu1y  yes  yes  no exceptions  not applicable
Iceland  yes  yes  Board of  the FSA  0
India  yes  no  Board of each  respective  bank  not available
Indonesia  yes  yes  no  exceptions  0
Ireland  yes  no  not applicable  not applicable
Israel  yes  yes  Supervisor  of  Banks  0
Italy  yes  yes  no exceptions  not applicable
Jamaica  yes  yes  none allowed  not applicable
Japan  yes  yes  no exceptions  no exceptions
Jordan  yes  yes  Borad  of Directors  or  the Governor  0
Kenya  yes  yes  Ministry  of Finance  0
Korea  yes  yes  no exceptions  not applicable
Kuwait*  yes  yes  Governor  or CB Board of  Directors  rarely
Latvia  yes  yes  not reported  not reported 40Table 4
Prudential  Bank Regulations  and  Their Enforcement
Must  infractions  of any  Any mandatory
prudential  regulation  found  by  actions  in these  Who authorizes  exceptions  to such actions  Hast  year?
a supervisor  be reported?  cases?
Lebanon  yes  yes  Govemor  and higher  Banking  Council authorizes  fey,
certain  exceptions,  taking  into consideration  the BCC
recommendations  and on condition  that these
infractions  be cleared  within a determined  period  of
time
Lesotho  yes  yes  Govemor/Minister  of Finance  not available
Liechtenstein  yes  yes  not reported  not reported
Lituania  yes  no  not applicable  not applicable
Luxembourg  yes  yes  no exceptions  0
Macau  yes  yes  Secretary  of Economy  and Finance  on the  0
recommendation  of Monetray  Authority  of Macau
Macedonia  yes  yes  not reported  not reported
Malawi  yes  yes  General  Manager,  Economic  Services  upon the  0
advice  of Director,  Bank Supervision
Malaysia  yes  yes  Minister  of Finance  or Govemor  O
Maldives  yes  yes  no exceptions  not applicable
Malta  yes  yes  Governor  and senior officials  of the supervisory  0
department
Mauritius  yes  yes  no exceptions  not applicable
Mexico  yes  yes  National  Banking  and Security  Commission  not reported
Moldova  yes  yes  no exceptions  not applicable
Morocco  yes  yes  Govemor  not reported
Namibia  yes  yes  Govemor  0
Nepal  yes  yes  Govemor  or  Board of Directors  of Central Bank  O
Netherlands  yes  yes  Nederlandsche  Bank  0
New  Zealand  yes  no  not applicable  not applicable
Nigeria  yes  yes  Govemor  of  CBN  0
Oman  yes  yes  Executive  President,  CB  0
Panama  yes  no  Superintendent  of Banks  0
Peru  yes  yes  no exceptions  0
Philippines  yes  yes  Monetary  Board of the  CB  0
Poland  yes  yes  Commision  for Banking  Supervision  0
Portugal  yes  no  not applicable  not applicable
Puerto  Rico  yes  no  Commission  0
Qatar  yes  yes  Govemor  not reported
Romania  yes  no  not  applicable  not applicable
Russia  yes  yes  The procedure  for inspecting  credit institutions  not reported
including  determining  the duties of credit insitutions
in assisting  inspection  is set by the Board of
Directors,  Central  Bank
Rwanda  yes  yes  Banque  Nacional  du Rwanda  0
Samoa  (Westem)  yes  yes  not reported  not reported
Saudi  Arabia  yes  yes  no exceptions  0
Seychelles  yeyes  yes  0
Singapore  yes  not reported  not reported  not reported
Slovenia  yes  yes  Governing  Board of the Central  Bank  0
Solomon  Islands  yes  no  not applicable  0
South  Africa  yes  no  Registrar  of Banks  many
Spain  yes  yes  Bank of Spain  0
Sri Lanka  yes  yes  Monetary  Board  0
St. Kitts  yes  no  not applicable  not applicable
Sweden  yes  yes  Finansinspektionen  0
Switzerland  yes  yes  Federal  Commission  of Banks  (CFB)  not reported
Taiwan  (China)  yes  yes  Ministry  of Finance  0
Tajikistan  yes  yes  National  Bank of Tajikistan  0
Thailand  yes  yes  Senior  Director  or Director,  Supervision  Department  not reported
Tonga  yes  yes  NRBT  Board of Directors  0  41Table 4
Prudential  Bank Regulations  and Their  Enforcement
Must  Infractions  of any  Any mandatory
prudential  regulation found by  actions  in these  Who authorizes exceptions to such actions  last  wer  e
a supervisor  be reported?  caxs?e
Trinidad  & Tobago  yes  yes  Inspector  of Banks  0
Turkey  yes  yes  no exceptions  0
Turks  and Caicos  yes  yes  Govemor  or Pemanent Secretary  of Finance  not reported
United  Kingdom  yes  no  not applicable  not applicable
United  States  yes  no  not applicable  not applicable
Vanuatu  yes  ya  Minister  of Finance  0
Venezuela  yae  no exceptions  0
Vietnam  not reported  not reported  not reported  not reported
Zambia  yes  y  Bank  of Zambia  few
42Table 5
Information  on Bank  Structural,  Regulatory,  Supervisory  and Deposit  Insurance  Variables:  Averages  by Income  Level
Varbable  High  Upper middle  Lower middle  Lower  Developed  Developing  or  |  Offshore
income  income  income  income  countries  emerging markets  |  centres
L  Bank Aicvity Regulatory  Variables
_(a) Securities  Activities  1  1.43  1.96  2.23  2.11  1.37  |  2.04  1.88
(b) Insurance  Activities  2.32  2.60  2.81  3.58  2.22  2.90  2.75
_  (c) Real  Estate Activities  2.38  3.00  3.15  3.42  2.04  3.19  3.00
2. Mixing  BankinglComnmerce  Regulatory  Variables
|(a) Bank  Ownership  of Nonfinancial  Firms  |  2.27  2.36  |  2.77  |  2.47  |  2.22  2.53  _  2.00
(b) Nonfinancial  FrmOwnership  ofBanks  1.97  2.00  2.19  2.00  1.77  J  213  2.59
3.  Compedtion  Regulatory  Variables
_(a) Limitations  on Foreign Bank  1  0.19  1
Ownership  of Domestic  Banks  017  0.44  014  008  0.31  0.00
(b) Limitations  on Foreign  Bank Entry  0.07  0.11  0.24  0.14  0.04  0.17  0.00
_c) Entry  into Banking  Requirements  7.17  7.33  7.50  7.42  7.19  7.38  7.50
4. Capital Regulatory  Variables
(a) Overall Capital  Stringency  3.89  3.54  3.00  311  4.19  3.20  2.13
(b  Initial Capital  Stringency  169  1.58  1.48  1.37  1.85  1.46  t1.13
(c) Capital  Regulatory Index  5.60  5.13  4.42  4.47  6-08  4.65  3.25
(d) Maximum  Capital Percentage  by Single Owner  80.46  59.96  61.92  56.06  88.70  59.49  50.63
5. Official  Supervisory  Action  Variables
(a) Official Supervisory  Power  10.64  11.67  11.04  11.37  11.08  11.11  10.00
|  (1)PromptCorrectiveAction  1.25  3.08  1.69  2.47  1.19  2.27  0.75
|  (2)RestructuringPower  2.46  2.58  2.64  2.68  2.50  2.60  2.13
(3) Declaring  Insolvency  Power  1.21  1.75  1.77  1.50  1.27  1.62  1.00
(b) Supervisory  Forbearance  Discretion  1.92  1.33  1.35  1.72  1.96  1.49  2.13
(c) Loan Classification  Stringency  331.00  |  284.12  |  342.29  |  631.00  280.33  1  408.05  290.00
i(d) Provisioning  Stringency  42.43  |  134.29  |  149.80  |  146.00  I  33.70  |  133.36  |  73.13
v  (e) Liquidity / Diversification  Index  1.94  2.04  2.00  1.68  |  2.04  1.90  1  1.38
6.  Official  Supervisory  Resource  Variables
(a) Supervisors  perBank  1.71  3.47  3.27  2.33  0.94  3.13  1.94
(b) Bank  Supervisor Years per Bank  |  21.65  |  25.72  50.48  12.87  10.96  31.79  9.12
(c)Supervisor  Tenure  7.86  7.28  8.80  5.64  8.57  7.14  |  4.25
(d) Onsite Examination  Frequency  1.71  1.43  1.39  |  1.56  1.70  1.49  |  1.86
(e) Likelihood  Supervisor  Moves into Banking  1.94  1.75  1.96  |  1.53  1.92  1.79  1  1.57
m(tlIndependenceofSupervisory  Authority  2.00  1.54  1.63  1.47  2.19  1.55  1.38
7. PrIvate Monitoring  Variables
(a) Certified Audit Required  0.92  1.00  0.92  0.89  0.96  0.92  0.88
(b) Percent of  10 Biggest  Banks Rated by  6882  66.65  47.50  6.67  68.50  44.69  32.50
Intemational  Rating  Agencies  I  I  I  I
(c) Accounting  Disclosure  and Director  Liability  2.60  2.91  2.54  2.44  2.54  2.66  2.83
(d) No  Explicit Deposit  Insurance  Scheme  0.33  |  0.28  0.44  0.63  0.08  0.51  |  0.63
(e) Private  Monitoring  Index  7,14  |  7.21  6.54  |  5.47  6.85  6.66  6.38
8.  Deposit Insurance  Scheme  Variables
(a) Deposit  Insurer Power  0.83  [  0.76  0.46  0.86  0.83  0.68  0.50
(b) Extra Deposit  Insurance  Coverage  0.50  0.25  0.50  0.00  0.50  0.30  0.00
(c) Deposit  Insurance Payout  Delay  4.73  2.77  7.95  21.06  4.73  8.23  N/A
(d) Deposit  Insurance  Funds-to-Total  Bank Assets  3.03  [  0.27  0.53  1.27  3.03  0.56  0.11
(e  Moral Hazard Index  - 0.92  [  0.84  -0.53  1.31  1.32  0.08  N/A
9.  Market Structure  Indicators
(a) Bank  Concentration  63.75  66.48  72.35  72.91  60.92  |  70.47  69.51
(b)ForeignBankOwnership  33.57  31.72  33.75  33.59  24.81  35.47  70.55
(c) Govemment  Owned Banks  -10.28  12.32  28.32  35.36  10.27  22.34  12.38
(d)NurnberofNewBanks  49.29  6.29  4.84  10.53  64.39  6.97  7.67
(I) New  Domestic  Banks  36.37  2.83  6.82  6.47  50.60  4.76  2.29
(2) New  Foreign Banks  9.26  3.47  1.70  3.89  10.78  3.22  4.29
(e)NoEntryApplications  0.09  0.14  0.13  0.00  |  0.04  0.11  w0.13
(I)NoDo  esticApplications  0.31  0.25  0.30  0.11  0.24  0.27  0.25
(2)NoForeignApplications  0.16  0.30  0.43  0.22  0.08  0.33  0.25
(f) Fraction  of Entry Applications  Denied  7.69  11.99  32.22  49.32  3.21  31.45  36.67
()IForeignDenials  7.16  I  8.33  28.04  49.82  2.13  29.32  19.05
(2) Domestic  Denials  6.91  16.85  |  30.83  37.85  3.21  |  28.21  40.99
43Table 6
Information on Bank Structural, Regulatory, Supervisory and Deposit Insurance Variables:  Averages by Region
1East  Asia  &  Eujrope  and  Middle  East  Sot  Sub-.  Non-J  J  Non-
Variable  |Amicas  Pacific  Central  Asia  and North  |  Saharan  OECD  OECD  Non-EU  EU  Euroland  Euroland
L  Bank Adivity  Regulatory  Variables
_(a)  Securities  Activities  2.18  2.41  1.51  1.45  1.67  2.07  2.00  1.50  1.99  1.13  1.96  1.09
(b) Insurance  Activities  2.59  2.76  2.27  3.45  3.17  3.36  2.90  2.25  2.82  1  2.20  2.79  2.18
(c)  Real  Estate  Activities  2.82  3.24  [  2.27  3.73  3.33  3.43  3.16  2.14  3.07  1.87 j  3.02  L  1.82
2. Mixing Banking/Commnerce  Regulatory  Variables
(a) Bank  Onership  ofNonfinancial  Firms  2.59  2.65  2.27  |  2.73  |  200  2.43  2.51  2.29  2.51  2.07  250  2.00
(b)  Nonfinancial  FimOwnershi ofBanks  2.17  2.35  1.73  1.82  317  1.93  2.12  1.79  2.12  1.53  |  209  |  1.55
3.  CompetItlon Regulatory  Variables
_(a)  Limitations  on  Foreign  Bank  0.20  0.63  0.06  0.50  0.67  014  027  1 016  1 029  1000  1 028  1  0.00
OwnershipofDomesticBanks  I  0..  1  0.5  _  0.67  _  0.14  1  0.2  4  0.1  |  0.2  |  0.0  |  0.2  |
(b)LimitationsoniForeign  BankEntry  0.27  0.25  0.06  0.10  0.33  0.00  0.18  0.04  0.16  0.00  |  0.15  |  0.00
(c)  Entry  into  Banking  Requirements  7.32  7.12  7.39  7.36  6.67  7.77  7.40  7.15  7.38  7.07  |  7.40  |  6.73
4. Capital  Regulatory  Variables
(a) Overall  Capital  Stringency  3.18  |  2.94  3.72  4.00  3.00  3.54  3.23  4.07  3.30  4.33  3.32  4.55
(b)  Initial  CapitalStringency  1.36  1.59  1.86  1.45  1.40  |  1.15  1.43  1.93  1.49  1.93  1.53  1.82
(c) Capital  Regulatory  Index  4.55  4.50  5.58  5.45  4.17  4.69  4.64  6.04  4.78  6.27  64.3  6.36
(d)MaximumCapitalPercentagebySingleOwner  74.09  51.19  80.41  61.09  41.50  53.57  62.77  78.54  61.48  100.00  63.11  100.00
5.  OffidiatSupervlsoryAdon  Variables L(a)  Official  Supervisory  Power  10.64  11.00  11.08  12.55  10.67  11.08  11.18  10.89  11.24  10.27  11.16  10.64
(1)PromptCorrectiveAction  |  1.55  2.24  1.61  3.64  0.00  3.08  2.18  |  1.48  2.21  0.73  2.14  0.82
(2) RestructuringPower  2.55  2.88  2.51  2.55  2.67  2.38  2.58  2.56  2.61  2.33  2.60  2.36
(3)Declaring  Insolvency  Power  1.67  1.67  1.39  1.55  0.83  1.85  1.57  1.41  1.59  1.20  1.57  1.18
(b)SupervisoryForbearanceDiscretion.  1.55  1.56  1.69  1.09  2.67  1.46  1.49  1.93  1.53  2.07  1.54  2.18
(c) Loan  Classification  Stringency  |  321.81  298.60  254.55  1  285.83  |  1303.00 |  411.25  414.63  285.00  397.80  630.00  |  397.80  630.00
d)Provisionin Stringency  |  120.82  119.19  71.54  118.18  1  115.83  - 161.92  129.17  |  48.79  1  121.24  26.67  118.74  13.64
(e) Liquidity  /Diversification  Index  1.59  1.71  2.03  2.64  1.67  2.08  1.92  |  1.96  |  1.90  2.13  1.88  IS  2.36
6t Officlal Supervisory  Resource  Variables
a Supervisors  perBank  3.18  4.03  1.31  3.24  4.38  2.50  2.97  1.62  2.96  0.61  2.88  |  0.55
(b)BankSupervisorYearsperBank  26.06  |  69.27  11.25  44.81  30.83  13.38  30.52  |  13.34  29.86  j  5.78  29.29  |  4.17
(c) SupervisorTenure  7.76  |  9.14  7.08  9.46  4.90  6.20  7.12  8.84  7.19  9.48  7.27  |  9.35
(d) Onsite  Examination  Frequency  1.45  1.20  1.70  1.68  1.60  1.54  1.45  1.84  1.47  2.00  1.49  |  1.89
(e) Likelihood  Supervisor  Moves into Banking  2.09  1.59  1.97  1.67  1.40  1.57  1.84  1.77  1.78  |  207  1.79  |  2.10
(f) Independence  ofSupervisory  Authority  1.59  1.47  1.97  2.00  J  1.50  1.33  1.55  2.15  1.61  |  227  |  1.62  |  2.45
Z  Private  Monitoring Variables
(a) Certified  Audit  Required  1.00  0.82  0.94  0.91  1.00  0.92  0.92  0.96  0.93  0.93  0.94  0.91
(b)PercentoflOBiggestBanksRatedby  I  55.71  74.17  56.92  65.56  |  0.00  16.36  42.04  75.00  |  48.57  |  66.15  4910  |  70.00
International  Rating Agencies  I  I  4  _  _  _  _  J
(c) Accounting  Disclosure  and Director  Liability  2.75  2.57  |  2.51  3.00  2.50  2.54  2.66  2.54  2.67  2.40  2.66  2.36
(d) NoExplicitDepositInsuranceScheme  0.32  0.76  J  0.11  0.55  0.67  0.57  0.51  007  0.47  |  0.00  0.45  |  0.00
e) Private  Monitoring  Index  6.73  7.00  j  6.41  8.45  5.33  6.31  6.69  6.75  6.71  6.67  6.72  6.64
44Table 6
Information on Bank Structural, Regulatory, Supervisory and Deposit Insurance Variables:  Averages by Region
East  Asia  &  Europie  and  Middle  East  South  Sub-  Non-  Non-
Variable  Americas  iPaciic  Central Asia  and North  Asi  Saharan  OECD  OED  |  -U  EU  Euroland  Eurond ]  [  ~~~~~~~Africa  _  _  __]  Africa  1_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
8. Deposit Insurance  Scheme  Variables
_  Deposit  Insurer Power  1.27  1.00  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.67  0.80  0.64  0.82  0.47  0.76  0.64
(b) Extra Deposit  Insurance Coverage  0.42  0.00  0.45  0.00  1.00  0.25  0.32  0.43  0.34  0.45  0.35  0.44
(c) Deposit Insurance  Payout Delay  5.46  5.56  5.47  0.03  6.00  30.75  9.55  4.30  7.73  4.32  7.34  4.44
(d) Deposit  Insurance Funds-to-Total Bank Assets  0.34  0.11  2.51  0.35  0.12  2.04  0.58  2.70  0.54  4.98  0.57  7.41
(e) Moral Hazard Index  _  1.24  -0.60  1.48  -2.49  2.95  0.77  -0.77  1.87  011  1.94  0.23  2.02
9.  Market  Structire  Indicators  _
(a) Bank Concentration  62.47  66.80  65.42  72.04  65.45  82.77  70.96  59.78  69.57  59.19  69.68  56.17
(b) Foreign  Bank Ownership  39.27  42.20  28.70  24.56  17.29  35.89  36.18  22.97  34.98  16.29  34.23  19.97
(c) Government Owned Banks  12.20  13.20  19.33  13.76  59.98  24.10  21.17  14.03  20.70  9.98  19.93  12.97
(d)NumberofNewBanks  60.50  8.23  18.24  2.56  21.40  5.10  6.73  67.68  22.14  25.69  21.59  30.80
(1) New Domestic  Banks  54.84  7.31  10.10  0.70  14.40  3.00  4.50  53.25  17.47  15.79  17.02  18.64
(2) New Foreign  Banks  2.47  6.23  8.86  1.70  5.83  1.82  3.11  11.45  4.16  11.15  4.13  13.50
(e)No  Entry Applications  0.14  0.20  0.03  0.20  0.00  0.00  0.11  0.04  0.11  0.00  0.11  0.00
(1) No Domestic  Applications  0.19  0.50  0.19  0.60  0.20  0.00  0.28  0.21  0.27  0.21  0.26  0.27
(2) No Foreign  Applications  0.29  0.31  0.13  0.50  0.50  0.18  0.32  0.09  0.29  0.08  0.28  0.10
(fl Fraction ofEntry  Applications  Denied  14.82  43.50  8.19  19.05  69.41  37.01  30.43  4.48  27.25  3.67  26.23  3.23
(I )Foreign  Denials  11.96  38.35  6.30  20.00  56.92  40.74  28.29  1.71  24.29  1.67  22.99  2.22
_  (2) Domestic Denials  13.74  38.96  12.95  12.50  64.63  24.09  26.45  7.67  24.21  5.42  23.53  3.37
45Table 7a
Correlations Among Selected Variables
Securities  Insurance  Real estate  Bank ownership of  Nonfinancial  firm
activities  activities  activities  nonfinancial  firmns  ownership of banks
0.37  0.41  0.16  0.29
Securities activities  - (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.  10  )  (0.00)
104  104  104  104
0.37  0.48  0.14  0.13
Insurance activities  (0.00)  - (0.00)  (0.15)  (0.20)
104  104  104  104
0.41  0.48  0.29  0.19
Real estate activities  (0.00)  (0.00)  - (0.00)  (0.05)
104  104  104  104
Ban ownership0.16  0.14  0.29  0.07
Bank ownership of  (0.10)  (0.15)  (0.00)  - (0.49)
nonfinancial  firms  104  104  104  104
Nonfinancial  firm  0.29  0.13  0.19  0.07
pn  ofir  bank(0.00)  (0.20)  (0.04)  (0.49)  -
ownership of  banks  104  104  104  104
Note: The top number is the Pearson  correlation  coefficient,  the middle number  the P-value,
and the bottom number  is the number  of countries  providing  information  for the two variables.
46Table 7b
Correlations Among Selected Variables
Securities  Insurance  Real  estate  Bank ownership of  Nonfinancial  firm
activities  activities  activities  nonfinancial  firms  ownership  of banks
0.01  -0.15  -0.22  -0.05  -0.11
Moral hazard index *  (0.96)  (0.39)  (0.21)  (0.77)  (0.52)
34  34  34  34  34
-0.27  -0.26  0.02  0.03  0.01
Private  monitoring index  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.84)  (0.77)  (0.94)
104  104  104  104  104
Officia  supervisory  0.07  -0.06  0.04  0.09  -0.03 Official  supervisor'  (0.49)  (0.56)  (0.67)  (0.38)  (0.75)
powver  104  104  104  104  104
0.04  0.18  0.08  0.07  0.03
Prompt corrective action  (0.71)  (0.07)  (0.43)  (0.48)  (0.79)
104  104  104  104  104
Note: The top number  is the Pearson  correlation  coefficient,  the middle number  the P-value, and
the bottom number is the number  of countries  providing  information  for the two variables.
*  This variable is obtained from Demirglis-Kunt  and Detragiache  (2000).
47Table  7c
Correlations  Among  Selected  Variables
Moral hazard  Private  monitoring Official  supervisory  Prompt  corrective
index  index  power  action
-0.34  0.18  0.09
Moral hazard index  *  - (0.05)  (0.30)  (0.61)
34  34  34
-0.34  0.22  0.15
Private  monitoring  index  (0.05)  - (0.03)  (0.12)
34  105  105
Official  supervisory  0.18  0.22  0.49
power  (0.30)  (0.03)  - (0.00)
0.09  0.15  0.48
Prompt  corrective  action  (0.61)  (0.12)  (0.00)  -
34  105  105
Note: The  top number  is the Pearson  correlation  coefficient,  the middle  number  the P-
value, and the bottom  number  is  the number  of countries  providing  information  for
the two variables.
* This variable  is obtained  from Demirgtl0-Kunt  and Detragiache  (2000).
48Table 7d
Correlations  Among  Selected Variables
Variable  Pearson correlation  P-Value  Number of Variable  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~coefricient  PVle  countries
Onsite  Examination  Frequency  vs. Supervisors  per Bank  -0.17  0.12  81
Onsite  Examination  Frequency  vs. Bank Supervisor  Years  per Bank  0.21  0.10  6C
Onsite  Examination  Frequency  vs. Supervisor  Tenure  -0.18  0.13  70
Supervisors  per Bank  vs. Bank  Supervisor  Years  per Bank  0.88  0.00  7T3
Supervisors  per Bank vs. Supervisor  Tenure  0.38  0.00  74.
Limits  on Foreign  Bank Entry  vs. Limits on Foreign  Bank  Ownership  of Domestic  Banks  0.33  0.00  76
Government  Owned  Banks  vs. Limits  on Foreign  Bank  Entry  0.22  0.07  6"
Government  Owned  Banks  vs. Foreign  Bank  Ownership  -0.33  0.00  8'>
Government  Owned  Banks  vs. Fraction  of Entry  Application  Denied  0.39  0.00  71
Government  Owned  Banks  vs. Private  Monitoring  Index  -0.33  0.00  9  _
Supervisory  Forbearance  Discretion  vs. Declaring  Insolvency  Power  -0.20  0 05  1002
Supervisory  Forbearance  Discretion  vs. Loan Classification  Stringency  -0.22  0 09  59
Supervisory  Forbearance  Discretion  vs. Provisioning  Stringency  0.34  0.00  ICi
Supervisory  Forbearance  Discretion  vs. Private  Monitoring  Index  -0.11  0.27  10.1
Supervisory  Forbearance  Discretion  vs.Prompt  Corrective  Action  -0.71  0.00  1041
Private  Monitoring  Index vs. Loan Classification  Stringency  0.21  0.]  61
Private  Monitoring  Index  vs. Provisioning  Stringency  -0.11  0.26  1C  X
Private  Monitoring  Index vs. Capital  Regulatory  Index  0.17  0.09  I1C4
Prompt Corrective  Action  vs. Loan Classification  Stringency  0.22  0.10  6t
Prompt Corrective  Action  vs. Provisioning  Stringency  0.33  0.00  1O4
Moral Hazard  Index7  vs. Deposit  Insurance  Authority  Power  -0.11  0.59  2i
Moral Hazard Index vs. Deposit  Insurance  Funds to Total  Bank Assets  -0.13  0.68  13
Maximum  Capital  by Single  Owner  vs. Actual Risk-Adjusted  Capital  0.24  0.02  9!
* This variable is obtained from Demirguc~-Kunt  and Detragiache (2000).
Note: The Loan Classification Stringency variable has been changed so that higher values indicate more stringency.
49Figure 1
Regulatory Restrictions on Bank Activities and the Mixing of Banking and Commerce:
Percentage Distribution of 107 Countries  by Degree of Restrictiveness
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Percent  of Deposits  Accounted  for by 5 Largest  Banks
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* Liechtenstein  Percent of Total Bank Assets Foreign Owned
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Overall  Bank  Activities  &  Ownership  Restridctiveness
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Minimum Capital-to-Asset Ratio Requirement






__________  _________  __________  _________  ____  nidaYd  and  Tobago
aVwan




_  igena  I  d
El S
#Mela
itco  aco  sad
mDnia
n  and  .
resece
flam  a
_____  ____  ____  _____  ____  ____  _____  ____  ____  _____  ___zech_  Republic
Sa
hsVianIslands




|  ::  a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~lmwaca
___________________________________~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~435tenssey
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _~~~~~~~~~~~Eaas 10°b
n~~~~~~~~  ~  ladszi
Arge!  ~  ~  ~  ~  sao  (Wstrn
0  4%  8%  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~12%  16%
i  . 'uns9Re~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~5Figure 10





-E  a  t  a~~~~~Litr






3  sh Virgin  Islands
|~~~~~~  Egypt
________  _______  _____  m  aiw,an  (China)
n  Zealand
C  zech  Republic
- :  P~anm  an
Thaleertands * - El  I .~~~~  nada
Germany
_  in  dminmna  11.6
*  --U  -UnFinland
* - U - in ~~~Dermark
*  - U - ~~~~~~~i  - z,eand
---U  Kenya  a
in - U  ~~~~~~Turkey
- Honduras









z  itdaad  and  Tobago
Brazil~ ~~~ai
Sa~~~~aW
-stonia  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  0Toa
Si  Xdie
w~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~II  Cammbia
*~~~~~~~~~~~~A  e  uersa
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ad  Arabia  ~
- uectenme
- _  Soro  Islands
_ _  _I  E  _
0  10  20  30  40  Ratio




China,  Cyprus,  Czech
Republic,  El  Salvador,
Malaysia,  Romania,
Sweden,  Turk  and  Caicos
Islands,  Vanuatu
Gm*GwaVZ
Botswavyna  Cayman  Isunlads,  nay  sal  tlJpn
canakCraft  P*
GA~ ~~  Gwiemi  HmWiw
Botswana,  Cayman  Islands,  Hungary,  Israel,  Italy,  Japan,
Lebanon,  Macedonia,  Malta,  Mauritius,  Morocco,  Nepal,
New  Zealand,  Poland,  Portugal,  Puerto  Rico,  Russia,  St.
Kitts  and  Nevis,  Singapore,  Switzerland,  Trinidad  and
Tobago,  United  States,  Zambia
'  SP.a;.,l  Spin MO  B....  .. r..
Arge*W  Austai, Belgium,  Denmark,  Qatar,  United  Kingdom
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Note: The higher the value the more prompt is corrective action
60- Vanuatu  Figure 12








Bandadesh  ______m  _  Islands
Eh  ai  an
Weffinanand
atvia





-~~~~  ~  ~~~  - =  !kV^,,Oalm
-~~~  ~  - N3elanl
I  asUnited  Kngdom
' 90vaAustralia
0  2  4  6  8  1  0
Note: The higher the value the greater the stringency
61sSingapre  Figure 13
=  Sut Afca-  Official Supervisory Power
Turks  and  Caicos  Islands
mY~  Trinidadand  Tobago
!  jj  y-  Nue~~~~Pe  o Rico




=  T  a  i  w  a  n~~~~~~~~~~*  aia







_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  .M  :alawsp
oMdaw
..  Ta  ikis  tan  e
*  RGhana
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _eoia
_s  t e int  tb
_  Gambia  Jamic
tia ~~~Oa
RuCsZWia~  ~  ~~ovni
Noe  h  ihe  h  au  th  graerte  po  er  rrzt
_________________________________  _  m  o_  6am  Iester)
Maldi  rs _ _ _ _  _ _  _ _  _  _I_  _  _L  e  ba__  _  L  b  n o n
Sh  Republic
Bhuta  n
Be  u  Venezuela
m  m  ..  * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Vanuatu m  m  .. i"  lrnnt  tas1 ~~~~~m  m.  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~a
m  m..~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Pr
- m  u.tWan
m  m  Omnan
- mu.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ev
- ;  arain
a.  ..  m  um  u  .inSl  venia - mm  m  um  .i  Hungary
o  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18
Note: The higher the value the greater the power
62Figure 14
Prompt Corrective Action
Argentina,  Aruba,  Australia,  Bangladesh,  Belarus,  Bhutan,  Bolivia,  British  Virgin  Islands,  Canada,  Cayman
Islands,  China,  Cyprus,  El  Salvador,  Finland,  France,  Gambia,  Germany,  Gibraltar,  Greece,  Guemsey,  Guyana,
India,  Ireland,  Israel,  Italy,  Jamaica,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Macau,  Malawi,  Maldives,  Morocco,  Nepal,
Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Panama,  Poland,  Portugal,  Puerto  Rico,  Romania,  St Kitts  and  Nevis,  Saudi  Arabia,
Singapore,  Solomon  Islands,  South  Afnca,  Sn  Lanka,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  Thailand,  Tonga,  Trinidad  and
Tobago,  Turkey,  Turks  and  Caicos  Islands,  United  Kingdom,  Vanuatu,  Vietnam,  Zambia
Maayia,  $nlmbila,  Russia
d;Xtt~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~R1  0  010,  0
Crata,  Ghana,  S.  Korea,  Maurtus,  Peru
Austria,  Bahrair,  Botswana,  Brazil,,  Egypt,  Hungary,  Indonesia,  Japan,  Kenya,
Lebanton,  Maoedonia,  Oman,  Philippines,  Qatar,  Samoa,(Western),  Slovenia
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Note: The higher the value the more prompt is corrective action
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Restructuring  Power
Belarus,  Finland,  Jordan,
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Argentna,  Aruba,  Australia,  Austia,  Bahrain,  Bangladesh,  Belgium,  Bhutan,  Bolivia,  Botswana,  Brazil,
Burundi,  Cambodia,  Chile,  China,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  El  Salvador,  Gambia,  Ghana,  Gibraltar,  Greece,
Guatemnala,  Honduras,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Jamaica,  Japan,  Kenya,  S.  Korea,  Kuwait,  Lebanon,  Lesotho,
Liechtenstein,  Lithuania,  Luxenbourg,  Macau,  Macedonia,  Malaysia,  Maldives,  Malta,  Mexdco,  Morocco,
Namibia,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Nigeria,  Onan,  Panama,  Peru,  Philippines,  Poland,  Puerto  Rico
Qatar,  Romania,  Russia,  Rwanda,  Samoa  (Westemn),  Saudi  Arabia,  Sovenia,  Soloron  islands,  Spain,  Sri
Lanka,  Switzerand,  Taiwan  (China),  Tajikistan,  Thafand,  Turkey,  United  KLngdom,  UnNted  States,  Vanuatu,
Venezuela,  Vietnman
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Note:  The higher  the value  the more  prompt  is the power
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Declaring Insolvent Power
Bangladesh,  Cayman  Islands,
France,  Guemsey,  India,
Kuwait,  Lebanon,  Macau,
Moldova,  Nepal,  Sweden,
Trinidad  and  Tobago
Australia,  Austria,  Belum,  Canada,  China,
Egypt,  Estonia,  Ghana,  Guate a,  Irland,
Italy,  Latva,  LiUechte  Luxeborg,
Maldives,  Netherlands,  New  Zeal  Russia,
South  Afic,SpaSn,  SWizdland,  T  l*
(China),  Turks  and  Cak Islands,
Uned indM
Argentina,  Aruba,  Bahrain,  Belarus,  Bhutan,  Bolivia,  Botswana,  Brazil,  Burundi,  Cambodia,  Chile,
Croatia,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  El  Salvador,  Finland,  Gambia,  Germany,  Gibraltar,
Greece,  Guyana,  Honduras,  Hungary,  Indonesia,  Israel,  Jamaica,  Japan,  Jordan,  Kenya,  S.  Korea,
Lesotho,  Lithuania,  Macedonia,  Malawi,  Malaysia,  Malta,  Mauritius,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Namibia,
Nigera,  Onman,  Panama,  Peru,  Philippines,  Poland,  Portugal,  Puerto  Rico,  Qatar,  Romania,
Rwanda,  St.  Klfts  and  Nevis,  Samoa  (Wester),  SaudiArabia,  Slovenia,  Solomon  Islands,  Sri
Lanka,  Tajikistan,  Thailand,  Tong4o  Turkey,  United  States,  Vanuatu,  Venezuela,  Zambia
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Supervisory  Forbearance Discretion
Burundi,  Chile,  Czech





Austria,  Bahrain,  Bolivia,  Botswana,  Brazil,  Cambodia,
Croatia,  Estonia,  Finland,  Ghana,  Gibraltar,  Hungary,
Indonesia,  Japan,  Kenya,  S.  Korea,  Kuwait,  Latvia,
Lebanon,  Lesotho,  Liechtenstein,  Malta,  Mauritus,
Mexico,  Namibia,  Nigeria,  Oman,  Peru,  Philippines,
Qatar,  Russia,  Rwanda,  Samoa  (Westem),  Slovenia,
Spain,  Taiwan  (China),  Tajikistan,  Turks  and  Caicos
Islands,  United  States
Belarus,  British  Virgin  Islands,  Cayman  Islands,
China,  Cyprus,  El  Salvador,  Greee,  Guyana,  Israet,
7tly,  Jamaica,  7ithuania,  Luxembourg,  Macau,
Malawi,  Makdles,  Morocco,  Nepal,  Nethewiands,
Portugal,  Puerto  Rico,  Romania,  St Kitts  and  Nevis,
Saudi  Arabia,  Singapore,  Si Lanka,  $weden,
Switzerfand,  Thailand,  Tonga  Trinidad  and  Tobago,
Turkey,  Vanuatu,  Zambia
Argentina,  Aruba,  Australia,  Bangladesh,  Canada,  France,  Germany,  Guemsey,
India,  Ireland,  New  Zealand,  Panama,  Polartd,  Sohomon  Islands,  South  Afies,
United  Kingdom
Belgium,  Bhutan,  Gambia
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Note: The higher the value the greater the discretion
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Bahrain,  Bangladesh,  Bhutan,
British  Virgin  Islands,  Gambia,
Gibraltar,  Greece,  Guyana,  Icekand,
India,  Jamaica,  Jordan,  Kenya,  S.
Korea,  Latvia,  Lebanon,  Macau,
Mauitius,  Mexico,  Oman,  Poland,
St Kitts  and  Nevis,  Tajwsan,
Turks  and  Caicos  Istands,  United
States,  Vanuatu,  Vietnam,  Zambia
Austia,  Belarus,  Belgium,  Botswana,  8razi,  Sundi,  Camoda
Canada,  Cypus,  Denmak,  Egypt  Estxa  Finland,  Gemany,
Guatemala,  Indonesia,  Israel,  aly, Lesoto,  ULc h  ,  Lu  mbg,
Malawi,  Malsia,  Morocco,  Nep Ntherlands,  Nw  Zealad,  NIea,
Panama,  Portugal,  Puert  Rico,  Rwara,  Saudi  abia,  Nia
Solomon  Isands  Spain,  Sfi  Lanka,  Sweden,  Taiwan  (China,  Thailand,
Trlndad  and  Tobgo,  Turkey
Argentina,  Aruba,  Australia,  Bolivia,  Cayman  Islands,  Chile,  China,  Croatia,  El  Salvador,  Honduras,
Hungary,  Ireland,  Kuwait,  Lithuania,  Moldova,  Namibia,  Peru,  Philipines,  Romnania,  Russia,  Singapore,
South  Afica,  United  Kingdom,  Venezuela
0  1  2  3
Note: The higher the value the greater the likelihood
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Private Monitoring  Index
Bangladesh,  Nepal,  Rwanda
Kenya,  Lata, Solomon  Islands,  Vietnam
British  Virgin  Islands,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,
Germany,  Guatemala,  Iceland,  Lesotho,  Malawi,
Maldives,  Russia
Autia,  elium, **an  Fmi:  0  l  *  Greece,
Slovenia,  Swe#den,  Thai7Wd,  Tonga  Tnid:adzlTrky0
:TurlX a7nd>i;s1  _
Aruba,  Bolivia,  Canada,  Caymffan  fIslands,  China,  Croatia,  Denmark,
Estonia,  Gibraltar,  Honduras,  Jordan,  Liechtenstein,  Macau,  Mauritius,  New
Zealand,  Poland,  Sit.  Kitts  and  Nevis,  Taiikistan,  Vanuatu
A4rgentmna,  Bahrain,  Botswana,  Brazil,  Burunldi,  Chite,  Eg7ypt7  El  Salvzador,  Guem.sey,
Guyana,  Indoneia,  Jlapan,  Narmibia,  Ofman,  Pasnama,  Peru,  Philippines,  Portugal,  Oatar,
Samoa  (tWestem),  Souh Atfica,  Spain,  Switzerland7  United  .4ingdom,  United  7States,
Zambia
Finland,  Israel,  Lebanon,  Malaysia,  Mafta,  Singapore,  Sri  Lanka,  Taiwan  (China)
0  2  4  6  8  10
Note: Tehigher  the value the greater private monitoring
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I United  States
0  20%  40%  60%  80%  100%
No denial of entry  applicants:  Argentina,  Belarus,  Belgium,  Bolivia,  British  Virgin Islands,  Cyprus,  Estonia,
Finland,  Germany,  Greece,  Guernsey,  Ireland,  Japan,  Latvia,  Lebanon,  Lesotho,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Morocco,
Netherlands,  New Zealand,  Nigeria, Oman,  Peru,  Poland,  Portugal,  Puerto  Rico, Qatar,  Rwanda, Slovenia,  Spain,
Switzerland,  Tongo
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I Cayman  Islands
I United  States
0  20%  40%  60%  80%  100%
No denial of domestic entry applicants: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Botswana,  British Virgin Islands,
Burundi, Canada,  Cyprus, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Greece,  Japan, Latvia,
Lesotho, Liechtenstein,  Macau, Malawi, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Rwanda, Spain, Switzerland, Venezuela
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0  20%  40%  60%  80%  100%
No denial of foreign entry applicants: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Bolivia, British Virgin Islands,
Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Guernsey, Guyana, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia,
Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, Poland, Portugal,
Puerto Rico, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan (China), Tongo, Trinidad &
Tobago, United States, Zambia
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Information  on  Selected  Other  Variables  in  the  Database
Number  of  Number  Number  Standard  Minimum Maximum
World Bank  Survey  Questions  countries  providing  answering  answering  Mean  Median  deviation  value  value
information  yes  no__  _  _  _I_  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _
1.2  How many banks  are there  at present?  107  N/A  N/A  219.19  24.00  1,067.52  2.00  10,500.00
1.4  Is it legally  required  that applicants  for banking  licenses  submit  information  on the source  of  105  21  84  0.80  1.00  0.40  0.00  1.00
funds  to be used  as capital?  I
1.5.1  Are  law enforcement  authorities  consulted  during the  verification  of  the sources  of funds to be  101  57  44  0.56  1.00  0.50  0.00  1.00
used  as  bank capital?  I
1.1  1.1 Is the  amount or  quality of  capital  among  the primary  reasons  for denial of applications  for  53  33  20  0.62  1.00  0.49  0.00  1.00
banking  licenses?  I  I
1.11.2  Are banking  skills among  the primary  reasons  for denial of applications  for banking  licenses?  52  34  18  0.65  1.00  0.48  0.00  1.00
1.11.3  Is reputation  among  the primary  reasons  for denial  of applications  for banking  licenses?  52  37  15  0.71  1.00  0.46  0.00  1.00
1.11.4  Is an incomplete  application  among  the  primary reasons  for denial  of applications  for banking  52  26  26  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.00  1.00
licenses?
2.2 Can  related  parties own  capital in a bank?  106  99  7  0.93  1.00  0.25  0.00  1.00
2.4 What  fraction  of capital in the largest 10  banks  is owned  by commercial/industrial  and/or  55  N/A  N/A  0.36  0.20  0.36  0.00  1.00
financial  conglomerates?  I_  .
2.5 Can non-bank  financial  firns (e.g. insurance  companies,  financial  companies,  etc.)  own  107  100  7  0.93  1.00  0.25  0.00  1.00
commercial  banks?
3.2 Does  the minimum  capital-asset  ratio  vary  as a function  of an individual  bank's  credit risk?  108  28  77  0.37  0.00  0.44  0.00  1.00
3.5  Is subordinated  debt allowable  (required)  as  part of capital?  106  92  14  0.87  1.00  0.34  0.00  1.00
5.1  Is an extemal audit  a compulsory  obligation  for banks?  107  104  3  0.97  1.00  0.17  0.00  1.00
5.2  Are specific  requirements  for the extent  or nature  of the audit  spelled  out?  106  69  37  0.68  1.00  0.48  0.00  1.00
5.3  Are auditors  licensed  or certified?  107  101  6  0.94  1.00  0.23  0.00  1.00
5.4Dosupervisors  get  coiesofbankextemalauditorreports?  107  104  3  0.97  1.00  0.17  0.00  1.00
5.8  Has legal action been  taken by supervisors  against  an external  bank auditor  in the last 5 years?  55  14  41  0.25  0.00  0.44  0.00  1.00
6.2 Have  supervisory  authorities  forced  banks  to change  their internal  organizational  structure  in the  76  40  36  0.53  1.00  0.50  0.00  1.00
ast 5 years?
7.4 Do  liquidity  reserves  (or reserves  deposited  at the central  bank) eam any interest?  71  30  41  0.42  0.00  0.50  0.00  1.00
8.1.4  Is there a per person limit  on deposit  insurance?  57  47  10  0.82  1.00  0.38  0.00  100
8.1.5  Does the deposit  insurance  authority  make  the decision  to intervene  in a bank?  58  14  44  0.24  0.00  0.43  0.00  1.00
8.1.7  Does the deposit insurance  authority  have  the legal  power  to deal with (intervene  / takeover)  a
troubled  (though  perhaps  still solvent)  bank to reduce  the ultimate  burden on the  deposit insurance  14  10  4  0.71  1.00  0.47  0.00  1.00
fund?
8.2  As  a share  of total assets,  what is the value of large  denominated  debt liabilities  of banks-
subordinated  debt,  bonds, etc.-that  are  definitely  not covered  by any explicit  or implicit  savings  33  N/A  N/A  0.28  0.25  0.26  0.00  0.87
protections  scheme?  I_I_I__
8.3 As  part of failure  resolution,  how  many  banks  closed  or merged  in the last 5 years?  85  N/A  N/A  6.24  1.00  14.01  0.00  80.00
8.4  Were  depositors  wholly  compensated  (to the extent of legal protection)  the last time a bank  53  41  12  0.77  1.00  0.42  0.00  1.00
failed?
8.7 Has  the deposit insurance  agency/fund  ever taken  legal action against  bank  directors  or other  37  1_  26  0.30  0.00  0.46  0.00  1.00
bank  officials?  37_0_30______0_46
9.1 i, Utere  a  iOliiidi  clinitWiuii  ofa  'ison-pertorming  loan7"  ?16  7i  3n  ;  67  i 00  _0.4,____U  i4
9.6  If a customer has  multiple  loans  and one loan is classified  as  non-performing,  are the other loans  102  37  65  0.36  0.00  0.48  0.00  1.00
automatically classified  as non-performing?  t
10.1  Does accrued,  though unpaid,  interest  / principal  enter  the income  statement  while  the loan is  105  92  13  0.88  1  00  0.33  0.00  1 00
still  performing?  ....  _
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Information  on Selected Other Variables  in the Database
Number  of  Number  Number  Standard  Minimum Maximum
World Bank  Survey  Questions  countries  providing  answering  answering  Mean  Median  deviation  value  value
information  yes  no
10.1.1  Does accrued,  though unpaid,  interest/ principal  enter  the income  statement  while  the loan is  103  14  89  0.14  0.00  0.34  0.00  1.00
still non-performing?  _
10.2  After  how many  days in arrears  must interest  income  accrual  cease?  78  N/A  N/A  100.77  90.00  67.44  1.00  365.00
10.3  Are financial  institutions  required  to produce  consolidated  accounts  covering  all bank and non-  104  87  17  0.84  1.00  0.37  0.00  1.00
bank financial  subsidiaries?
10.4.1  Are off-balance  sheet items  disclosed  to the public?  103  72  31  0.70  1.00  0.46  0.00  1.00
10.5  Must banks  disclose  their  risk managemnt  procedures  to the public?  103  29  74  0.28  0.00  0.46  0.00  1.00
10.6  Are  bank directors  legally  liable  if information  disclosed  is erroneous  or misleading?  104  94  10  0.90  1.00  0.30  0.00  1.00
10.6.1  Have penalties  been enforced?  96  33  63  0.34  0.00  0.48  0.00  1.00
10.7  Do regulations  require  credit  ratings  for commercial  banks?  101  10  91  0.10  0.00  0.33  0.00  1.00
10.7.3.1  Are bonds  rated?  70  47  23  0.67  1.00  0.47  0.00  1.00
10.7.3.2  Is commercial  paper  rated?  70  39  31  0.56  1.00  0.50  0.00  1.00
10.7.3.3  Are otheractivities  rated  (e.g. bank certificates  of  deposit,  pension  and mutual funds,  68  33  35  0.49  0.00  0.50  0.00  1.00
insurance  companies,  financial  guarantees, etc.)?  .
11.4  Have  supervisory  agencies  suspended  directors'  decisions  to distribute  dividends,  bonuses  or  98  49  49  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.00  1.00
management  fees in the last 5 years?  _
11.9.5  Can supervisory  autihorities  insure liabilities  beyond any explicit  deposit  insurance  scheme?  98  16  82  0.16  0.00  0.37  0.00  1.00
11.10  How  many banks  have been  closed in the last five years?  102  N/A  N/A  16.58  1.00  116.24  0.00  1,172.00
12.3  Are  there important  differences  between  what  the supervisory  agency  is expected to do and  93  6  87  0.06  0.00  0.25  0.00  1.00
what is mandated by the law?
12.4  How many  professional  bank  supervisors  are there in total?  100  N/A  N/A  15540  42 50  363 62  0.00  3,200.00
74Appendix 2. Guide to Database on  Bank Regulation and Supervision
I.Entry into Banking
1.1 What body/agency  grants commercial  banking  licenses?
1.2  How  many commercial  banks  are there at present?
1.3  What  are the minimum  capital  entry  requirements  (in U.S. $ and/or  domestic  currency)?
1.4  Is it legally  required  that applicants  submit  information  on the source  of funds  to be used as capital"
1.5  Are  the sources  of funds  to be used as capital  verified  by  the regulatory/supervisory  authorities?
1.5.1 Are law enforcement  authorities  consulted  in this process?
1.6 Can the initial  disbursement  or subsequent  injections  of capital  be done with  assets other  than cash or
government  securities?
1.7 Can initial disbursement  of capital  be done with  borrowed  funds?
1.8 Which  of the following  are legally  required  to be submitted  before  issuance  of the banking  license?
1.8.1 Draft by-laws?
1.8.2 Intended  organization  chart?
1.8.3 Financial  projections  for  first three  years?
1.8.4 Financial  information  on main  potential  shareholders?
1.8.5 Background/experience  of future  directors?
1.8.6 Background/experience  of future  managers?
1.8.7 Sources  of funds  to be disbursed  in the capitalization  of new bank?
1.8.8 Market  differentiation  intended  for the new bank?
1.9 In the past five years,  how many  applications  for commercial  banking  licenses  have been  received
from domestic  entities?
1.9.1 How many of those applications  have been denied?
1.10 In the past five years,  how many  applications  for  commercial  banking  licenses  have been  received
from foreign  entities?
1.10.1  How many of those  applications  have been denied?
1.11 What  were the primary  reasons  for denial of the applications  in 1.9.1  and 1.10.1?
1.11.1 Capital amountorquality?
1.11.2 Banking  skills?
1.1  1.3 Reputation?
1.11.4 Incomplete  application?
2. Ownership
2.1  Is there a maximum  percentage  of bank capital  that can be owned  by a single  owner?
2.1.1 If yes,  what is the percentage?
2.2  Can related  parties  own capital  in a bank?
2.2.1 If yes, what are the maximum  percentages  associated  with  the total ownership  by a related
party group  (e.g., family,  business  associates,  etc.)?
2.3 What  is the level of regulatory  restrictiveness  of ownership  by nonfinancial  firms of banks?
Unrestricted  -A nonfinancial  firm may own 100  percent  of the equity in a bank.
Permitted  -Unrestricted  with prior authorization  or approval.
Restricted  - Limits  are placed  on ownership,  such as a maximum  percentage  of a bank's
capital  or shares.
Prohibited  -No equity  investment  in a bank.
2.4 What  fraction  of capital  in the largest 10  banks is owned  .by  commercial/industrial  and/or  financial
conglomerates?
2.5  Can non-bank  financial  firms (e.g.  insurance  companies,  finance  companies,  etc.) own commercial
banks?
2.5.1 What  are the limits?
2.6 Of deposit-taking  institutions  in your country,  what fraction  of deposits  is held by the five  (5) largest,
banks?
3. Capital
753.1  What is the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement?
3.1.1  Is this ratio risk weighted in line with the Basle guidelines?
3.2  Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of an individual bank's credit risk?
3.3  Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk?
3.4  What is the actual risk-adjusted capital ratio in banks today (latest available data)?
3.5  Is subordinated debt allowable (required) as part of capital?
3.6  What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital?
3.7  What fraction of the banking system's assets is in banks that are 50% or more government owned?
3.8  What fraction of the banking system's assets is in banks that are 50% or more foreign owned?
3.9  Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, which of the following are deducted from the book
value of capital?
3.9.1 Market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books?
3.9.2  Unrealized losses in securities portfolios?
3.9.3  Unrealized foreign exchange losses?
4. Activities
4.1  What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in securities activities ( the ability
of banks to engage in the business of securities underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the
mutual fund industry) ?
Unrestricted - A full range of activities in the given category can be conducted directly in the
bank.
Permitted - A full range of activities can be conducted, but all or some must be conducted in
subsidiaries.
Restricted - Less than a fill  range of activities can be conducted in the bank or subsidiaries.
Prohibited - The activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries.
4.2  What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in insurance activities ( the ability
of banks to engage in insurance underwriting and selling) ?
Unrestricted - A full range of activities in the given category can be conducted directly in the
bank.
Permitted - A full range of activities can be conducted, but all or some must be conducted in
subsidiaries.
Restricted - Less than a full range of activities can be conducted in the bank or subsidiaries.
Prohibited - The activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries.
4.3  What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness  for bank participation in real estate activities ( the ability
of banks to engage in real estate investment, development, and management) ?
Unrestricted - A full range of activities in the given category can be conducted directly in the
bank.
Permitted - A full range of activities can be conducted, but all or some must be conducted in
subsidiaries.
Restricted - Less than a full range of activities can be conducted in the bank or subsidiaries.
Prohibited - The activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries.
4.4  What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank ownership of nonfinancial firms?
Unrestricted - A bank may own 100 percent of the equity in any nonfinancial firm.
Permitted - A bank may own 100 percent of the equity in a nonfinancial firm, but ownership is
limited based on a bank's equity capital.
Restricted - A bank can only acquire less than 100 percent of the equity in a nonfinancial firm.
Prohibited - A bank may not acquire any equity investment in a nonfinancial firm.
5. External Auditing Requirements
5.1  Is an external audit a compulsory obligation for banks?
5.2  Are specific requirements for the extent or nature of the audit spelled out?
5.3  Are auditors licensed or certified?
5.4  Do supervisors get a copy of the auditor's report?
5.5  Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to discuss their report
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5.6  Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed
involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse?
5.7  Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence?
5.8  Has action been taken against an auditor in the last 5 years?
6. Internal Management/Organizational requirements
6.1  Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational structure?
6.2  Has this power been utilized in the last 5 years?
7. Liquidity & Diversification Requirements
7.1  Are there explicit, verifiable, and quantifiable guidelines regarding asset diversification?
7.2  Are banks prohibited from making loans abroad?
7.3  What are the requirements for  bank in terms of  liquidity reserves or any reserves whatsoever on
deposits at the Central Bank?
7.4  What interest, if any, is paid on these reserves?
7.5 What is the minimum reserve requirment (%)?
7.6 How is the reserve requirement remunerated?
7.7  What domestic and foreign assets satisfy these liquidity reserve or any other reserve requirements?
8. Depositor (Savings) Protection Schemes
8.1  Is there an explicit deposit insurance protection system? If yes:
8.1.1  Is it funded by (check one):  the government, the banks, or both ?
8.1.2  What is the ratio of accumulated funds to total bank assets?
8.1.3  What is the deposit insurance limit per account?
8.1.4  Is there a limit per person?
8.1.4.1  If yes, what is that limit (in domestic currency)?
8.1.5  Does the deposit insurance authority make the decision to intervene a bank?
8.1.6  If no, who does?
8.1.7 If yes, does the deposit insurance authority have the legal power to deal with
(intervene/takeover) a troubled (though perhaps still solvent) bank to reduce the ultimate
burden on the deposit insurance fund?
8.2  As a share of total assets, what is the value of large denominated debt liabilities of banks-
subordinated debt, bonds, etc.-that are definitely not covered by any explicit or implicit savings
protection scheme?
8.3  As part of failure resolution, how many banks closed or merged in the last 5 years?
8.4  Were depositors wholly compensated (to the extent of legal protection) the last time a bank failed?
8.4.1  On average, how long does it take to pay depositors in full?
8.4.2  What was the longest that depositors had to wait in the last 5 years?
8.5  Were any deposits not explicitly covered by deposit insurance at the time of the failure compensated
when the bank failed (excluding funds later paid out in liquidation procedures)?
8.6  Can the deposit insurance agency/fund take legal action against bank directors or other bank
officials?
8.7  Has the deposit insurance agency/fund ever taken legal action against bank directors or other bank
officials?
9. Provisioning Requirements
9.1  Is there a formal definition of a "non-performing loan" ?
9.1.1  If yes, what is it? Is the number of days in arrears the only or principal basis of asset
classification and provisioning?
779.2  Classification of loans in arrears based on their quality: after how many days is a loan in arrears
classified as:
9.2.1  Sub-standard ?
9.2.2  Doubtful?
9.2.3  Loss?




9.4  If you do not have a loan classification system based on sub-standard, doubtful and loss loans, please
describe the type of classification system you do have.
9.5  What is the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets (latest available)?
9.6  If a customer has multiple loans and one loan is classified as non-performing, are the other loans
automatically classified as non-performing?
10. Accounting/Information  Disclosure Requirements
10.1  Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement while the loan is still
performing?
10.1.1 Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement while the loan
is still non-performing?
10.2  After how many days in arrears must interest income accrual cease?
10.3 Are financial institutions required to produce consolidated accounts covering all bank and any non-
bank financial subsidiaries?
10.4  Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors?
10.4.1 Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to the public?
10.5  Must banks disclose their risk management procedures to the public?
10.6  Are bank directors legally liable if information disclosed is erroneous or misleading?
10.6.1  Have  penalties  been enforced?
10.7  Do regulations require credit ratings for commercial banks?
10.7.1  What percentage of the top ten banks are rated by international credit rating agencies (e.g.
Moody's, Standard and Poor)?
10.7.2  What percentage of the top ten banks are rated by domestic credit rating agencies ?
10.7.3  Which bank activities are rated?
10.7.3.1  Bonds?
10.7.3.2  Commercial paper?
10.7.3.3  Other activity (e.g., bank certificates of deposit, pension and mutual funds,
insurance companies, financial guarantees, etc.)?
11. Discipline/Problem Institutions/Exit
11.1  Are there any mechanisms of cease and desist-type orders, whose infraction leads to the automatic
imposition of civil and penal sanctions on the banks directors and managers?
11.2  Can the supervisory agency order the bank's directors or management to constitute provisions to
cover actual or potential losses?




11.4  Have any such actions been taken in the last 5 years?
11.5  Which laws address bank insolvency?
11.6  Can the supervisory agency legally declare-such that this declaration supersedes the rights of bank
shareholders-that a bank is insolvent?
11.7  Does the Banking Law give authority to the supervisory agency to intervene-that is, suspend some or
all ownership rights-a problem bank?
11.8  Does the Law establish pre-determined levels of solvency deterioration which forces automatic
actions (like intervention)?
11.9  Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other
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11.9.1  Supersede shareholder rights?
11.9.2  Remove and replace management?
11.9.3 Remove and replace directors?
11.9.4 Forbear certain prudential regulations?
11.9.5  Insure liabilities beyond any explicit deposit insurance scheme?
11.10 How many banks have been closed in the last five years?
11.10.1 What percentage of total bank assets did those banks account for?
12. Supervision
12.1  What body/agency supervises banks?
12.1.1  Is there more than one supervisory body?
12.2 To whom are the supervisory bodies responsible or accountable?
12.2.1  How is the head of the supervisory agency (and other directors) appointed?
12.2.2  How is the head of the supervisory agency (and other directors) removed?
12.3 Are there important differences between what the supervisory agency is expected to do and what is
mandated by law?
12.4 How many professional bank supervisors are there in total?
12.4.1  How many professional bank supervisors are there per institution?
12.5 How many onsite examinations per bank were performed in the last five years?
12.6 What is the total budget for supervision in local currency (in 1997 or 1998; please specify which)?
12.7 How frequently are onsite inspections conducted in large and medium size banks ( annually equals I
and every two years equals 2) ?
12.8  What is the average tenure of current supervisors (i.e., what is the average number of years current
supervisors have been supervisors)?
12.9  How often are bank supervisors employed by the banking industry once they quit their service as
bank supervisors? Never, Rarely,  Occasionally, or  Frequently?
12.10  If an infraction of any prudential regulation is found by a supervisor, must it be reported?
12.11 Are there mandatory actions in these cases?
12.12  Who authorizes exceptions to such actions?
12.13  How many exceptions were granted last year?
12.14  Are supervisors legally liable for their actions (e.g., if a supervisor takes actions against a bank can
he/she be sued) ?
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Argentina  Cambodia  Austalia  Bahrain  Bangladesh  Botswana
Aruba  China  Austria  Egypt  Bhutan  3urunmdi
Bolivia  Indonesia  Belarus  Israel  India  Grambia
Brazil  Japan  Belgium  Jordan  Maldives  Ghana
British Virgin Islands  Korea  Croatia  Kuwait  Nepal  Kenya
Canada  Macau  Cyprus  Lebanon  Sri Lanka  Lesotho
Cayman Islands  Malaysia  Czech Republic  Malta  Malawi
Chile  New Zealand  Denmark  Morocco  Mauritius
El Salvador  Philippines  Estonia  Oman  Namibia
Guatemala  Samoa  (Westem)  Finland  Qatar  Nigeria
Guyana  Singapore  France  Saudi Arabia  Rwanda
Honduras  Solomon  Islands  Germany  Seychelles
Jamaica  Taiwan (China)  Gibraltar  Scuth Africa
Mexico  Thailand  Greece  Zambia
Panama  Tonga  Guemsey
Peru  Vanuatu  Hungary
Puerto Rico  Vietnam  Iceland
Saint Kitts and Nevis  Ireland
Trinidad & Tobago  Italy
Turks and Caicos Islands  Latvia
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Argentina  India  Philippines  Australia
Aruba  Indonesia  Puerto  Rico  Austria
Bahrain  Israel  Qatar  Belgium
Bangladesh  Jamaica  Romania  Canada
Belarus  Jordan  Russia  Czech  Republic
Bhutan  Kenya  Rwanda  Denmark
Bolivia  Kuwait  Saint  Kitts  and  Nevis  Finland
Botswana  Latvia  Samoa  (Western)  France
Brazil  Lebanon  Saudi  Arabia  Germany
British  Virgin  Islands  Lesotho  Seychelles  Greece
Burundi  Liechtenstein  Singapore  Hungary
Cambodia  Lithuania  Slovenia  Iceland
Cayman  Islands  Macau  Solomon  Islands  Ireland
Chile  Macedonia  South  Africa  Italy
China  Malawi  Sri  Lanka  Japan
Croatia  Malaysia  Taiwan  (China)  Korea
Cyprus  Maldives  Tajikistan  Luxembourg
Egypt  Malta  Thailand  Mexico
El Salvador  Mauritius  Tonga  Netherlands
Estonia  Moldova  Trinidad  & Tobago  New  Zealand
Gambia  Morocco  Turks  and  Caicos  Islands  Poland
Ghana  Namibia  Vanuatu  Portugal
Gibraltar  Nepal  Venezuela  Spain
Guatemala  Nigeria  Vietnam  Sweden
Guemsey  Oman  Zambia  Switzerland
Guyana  Panama  Turkey
Honduras  Peru  United  Kingdom
United  States
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Argentina  Iceland  Peru  Austria
Aruba  India  Philippines  Belgium
Australia  Indonesia  Poland  Denmark
Bahrain  Israel  Puerto  Rico  Finland
Bangladesh  Jamaica  Qatar  France
Belarus  Japan  Romania  Germany
Bhutan  Jordan  Russia  Greece
Bolivia  Kenya  Rwanda  Ireland
Botswana  Korea  Saint  Kitts  and  Nevis  Italy
Brazil  Kuwait  Samoa  (Westem)  Luxrmbourg
British  Virgin  Islands  Latvia  Saudi  Arabia  Netherlands
Burundi  Lebanon  Seychelles  Portugal
Cambodia  Lesotho  Singapore  Spain
Canada  Liechtenstein  Slovenia  Sweden
Cayman  Islands  Lithuania  Solomon  Islands  United  Kingdom
Chile  Macau  South  Africa
China  Macedonia  Sri Lanka
Croatia  Malaw;  Switzerland
Cyprus  Malaysia  Taiwan  (China)
Czech  Republic  Maldives  Tajikistan
Egypt  Malta  Thailand
El Salvador  Mauritius  Tonga
Estonia  Mexico  Trinidad  & Tobago
Gambia  Moldova  Turkey
Ghana  Morocco  Turks  and  Caicos  Islands
Gibraltar  Namibia  United  States
Guatemala  Nepal  Vanuatu
Guernsey  New  Zealand  Venezuela
Guyana  Nigeria  Vietnam
Honduras  Oman  Zambia
Hungary  Panama
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Argentina  Hungary  Peru  Austria
Aruba  Iceland  Philippines  Bedgium
Australia  India  Poland  Finland
Bahrain  Indonesia  Puerto Rico  France
Bangladesh  Israel  Qatar  Germany
Belarus  Jamaica  Romania  Ireland
Bhutan  Japan  Russia  Italy
Bolivia  Jordan  Rwanda  Luxembourg
Botswana  Kenya  Saint Kitts and Nevis  Netherlands
Brazil  Korea  Samoa  (Westem)  Portugal
British Virgin Islands  Kuwait  Saudi Arabia  Spain
Burundi  Latvia  Seychelles
Cambodia  Lebanon  Singapore
Canada  Lesotho  Slovenia
Cayman  Islands  Liechtenstein  Solomon Islands
Chile  Lithuania  South  Africa
China  Macau  Sri Lanka
Croatia  Macedonia  Sweden
Cyprus  Malawi  Switzerland
Czech Republic  Malaysia  Taiwan  (China)
Denmark  Maldives  Tajikistan
Egypt  Malta  Thailand
El Salvador  Mauritius  Tonga
Estonia  Mexico  Trinidad & Tobago
Gambia  Moldova  Turkey
Ghana  Morocco  Turks  and Caicos  Islands
Gibraltar  Namibia  United Kingdom
Greece  Nepal  United  States
Guatemala  New Zealand  Vanuatu
Guernsey  Nigeria  Venezuela
Guyana  Oman  Vietnam
Honduras  Panama  Zambia
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Aruba  Argentina  Belarus  Bangladesh
Australia  Bahrain  Bolivia  Bhutan
Austria  Botswana  China  Burnmdi
Belgium  Brazil  Egypt  Cambodia
British Virgin Islands  Chile  El Salvador  Gambia
Canada  Croatia  Guatemala  Ghana
Cayman Islands  Czech Republic  Guyana  India
Cyprus  Estonia  Honduras  Indonesia
Denmark  Hungary  Jamaica  Kenya
Finland  Korea  Jordan  Lesotho
France  Lebanon  Latvia  Malawi
Germany  Malaysia  Lithuania  Moldova
Gibraltar  Malta  Macedonia  Nepal
Greece  Mauritius  Maldives  Nigeria
Guemsey  Mexico  Morocco  Rwanda
Iceland  Oman  Namibia  Solomon Islands
Ireland  Panama  Peru  Tajikistan
Israel  Poland  Philippines  Vietnam
Italy  Puerto Rico  Romania  Zambia
Japan  Saint Kitts and Nevis  Russia
Kuwait  Saudi Arabia  Samoa  (Westem)
Liechtenstein  Seychelles  Sri Lanka
Luxembourg  South  Africa  Thailand
Macau  Trinidad & Tobago  Tonga
Netherlands  Venezuela  Turkey
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Dartpd  countrls  (27)  DOfs  aft"t  m  (8)
Australia  Argentina  Indonesia  Philippines  Aruba
Austria  Aruba  Israei  Poland  Bahrain
Belgium  Bahrain  Jamaica  Puerto  Rico  Bangladesh
Canada  Bangladesh  Jordan  Qatar  British Virgin  Islands
Cayman Islands  Belarus  Kenya  Romania  Cayman Islands
Cyprus  Bhutan  Korea  Russia  Guernsey
Denmnark  Bolivia  Kuwait  Rwanda  Saint Kitts and Nevis
Finland  Botswana  Latvia  Saint Kitts and Nevis  Turks and Caicos Islands
France  Brazil  Lebanon  Samnoa  (Western)
Germany  British Virgin Islands  Lesotho  Saudi  Arabia
Gibraltar  Burundi  Lithuania  Seychelles
Greece  Cambodia  Macau  Singapore
Iceland  Chile  Macedonia  Solomon  Islands
Ireland  China  Malawi  South Africa
Italy  Croatia  Malaysia  Sri Lanka
Japan  Czech Republic  Maldives  Taiwan  (China)
Liechtenstein  Egypt  Malta  Tajikistan
Luxembourg  El Salvador  Mauritius  Thailand
Netherlands  Estonia  Mexico  Tonga
New Zealand  Gambia  Moldova  Tnnidad & Tobago
Portugal  Ghana  Morocco  Turkey
Slovenia  Guatemala  Namibia  Turks and Caicos
Spain  Guernsey  Nepal  Vanuatu
Sweden  Guyana  Nigeria  Venezuela
Switzerland  Honduras  Oman  Vietnam
United  Kingdom  Hungary  Panama  Zambia
United States  India  Peru
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Income: The World Bank  classifies economies  for operational  and analytical  purposes  primarily  by GNP
per capita. Every economy is classified as low income,  middle income  (subdivided  into lower middle  and
upper middle),  or high income. Other Analytical  groups,  based on geographic  regions and levels  of extemal
debt, are also used.
Low-income  and middle-income  economies  are sometimess  referred to as developing  economies. The
term is used for convenience;  it does  not imply  that all such economies  are experiencing  similar  development
or that other economies  have reached  a preferred or final  stage of development.  Nor does  classification  by
income necessarily  reflect development  status.
This table classifies all World Bank member  economies  as well as all other economies  with
populations  of more than 30,000. Economies  are divided  among  income groups  according  to 1999  GNP  per
capita, calculalated  using the World Bank Atlas  method. the groups  are as follows:  low income,  $755 or leE
lower middle income, $756-2,995;  upper middle income, $2,996-9,265;  and high income, $9,266  or more.
Region: The regions are AME  = Americas;  MNA  = Middle  East and North Africa;  ECA=Europe  and
Central Asia; SSA = Sub-Saharan  Aftica; SAS  = South  Asia; EAP = East  Asia and Pacific;
GDP: Figures in italics are the most recent estimate  from 1997  or 1998.  World  Bank Development
Indicators,  CD-ROM2000.
Population,  Statistical Abstract  of the  United States.
Banking  Activity Regulatory  and Mixing Banking  I Commerce  Regulatory  Variables  World  Bank and
OCC
All other Variables,  World Bank Survey
Sources:
U. S. Census of Bureau.  1999.  Statistical  Abstract  of the United States  (I  9th edition).  Washington,  DC.
World Bank.  2000.  World Development  Report,  2000/2001:  Attacking  Poverty.  New York: Oxford
World Bank. 2000. World Development  Indicators  2000. Washington,  D.C.
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